



# Assessment of the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program

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## Preface

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The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) created the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program in 1996. SLATT provides specialized terrorism/extremism orientation, interdiction, investigation, and prevention training to state, local, and tribal law enforcement executives, command personnel, patrol officers, intelligence officers, investigators, analytical personnel, and prosecutors. To date, the program has provided instruction to approximately 142,000 practitioners. To help the U.S. government better understand the nature and value of this training, the RAND Corporation, at the request of the National Institute of Justice and BJA, was awarded a contract to assess various aspects of the SLATT Program; the base year was dedicated to developing and refining the detailed assessment plan and collecting preliminary data, while option years 1 and 2 were dedicated to conducting the assessment.

This report presents the results of that assessment. It will be of interest to federal, state, and local enforcement; U.S. Attorney's Offices; the network of fusion centers and joint terrorism task forces (JTTFs); the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and others involved in homeland security at the local, state, and regional levels.

## RAND Justice Policy

The research reported here was conducted in the RAND Justice Policy Program, which spans both criminal and civil justice system issues with such topics as public safety, effective policing, police-community relations, drug policy and enforcement, corrections policy, use of technology in law enforcement, tort reform, catastrophe and mass-injury compensation, court resourcing, and insurance regulation. Program research is supported by government agencies, foundations, and the private sector.

This program is part of RAND Justice, Infrastructure, and Environment, a division of the RAND Corporation dedicated to improving policy- and decisionmaking in a wide range of policy domains, including civil and criminal justice, infrastructure protection and homeland security, transportation and energy policy, and environmental and natural resource policy.

Questions or comments about this report should be sent to the project leader, Lois M. Davis (Lois\_Davis@rand.org). For more information about RAND Justice Policy, see [www.rand.org/jie/justice-policy](http://www.rand.org/jie/justice-policy) or contact the director at [justice@rand.org](mailto:justice@rand.org).

# Contents

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Preface.....	iii
Summary.....	vi
Acknowledgments.....	xiv
1. Introduction.....	1
Role of Law Enforcement in Counterterrorism.....	1
Overview of the SLATT Program.....	2
Study's Objective and Scope.....	11
Approach.....	11
Study's Limitations.....	12
Organization of This Report.....	14
2. Terrorism Threat.....	15
General Terrorism Trends.....	15
Perceptions of Law Enforcement About the Terrorist Threat and Their Need for Training.....	21
Discussion.....	25
3. Planning Process for SLATT Workshops.....	27
Introduction.....	27
Methods.....	27
The Planning Process.....	28
Discussion.....	33
4. Participants' Assessment of SLATT Workshops.....	35
Introduction.....	35
Survey Methods.....	35
Survey Results.....	38
Discussion.....	54
5. SLATT's Costs and Benefits to Participants.....	56
Introduction.....	56
Analyzing Costs and Benefits to Training Participants.....	56
Discussion.....	66
6. Summary and Suggestions for Improving the SLATT Program.....	69
Findings.....	69
Suggestions for Improving BJA's SLATT Program.....	75
Suggestions for Future Assessments of BJA's SLATT Program.....	79

Appendix A. RAND Survey of SLATT Workshop Participants.....	82
Appendix B. Description of Select SLATT Program Features.....	91
Appendix C. Cost and Benefit Model Statistics .....	95
Lists of Figures and Tables .....	97
Abbreviations.....	99
Bibliography .....	100

# Summary

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## Introduction

The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) created the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program in 1996. The SLATT Program focuses on the prevention of terrorism by providing specialized training to state, local, and tribal law enforcement on understanding, detecting, deterring, and investigating acts of terrorism and violent extremism. From its onset in 1996, SLATT's trajectory has closely mirrored trends in terrorist activity, with its curricula shifting to address emerging or persistent threats to U.S. security. Given its creation after the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, SLATT was heavily focused on domestic terrorism issues. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, its focus shifted to include foreign terrorist attacks. In addition, SLATT training addresses homegrown violent extremism (HVE) and the sovereign citizen movement—phenomena that continue to concern law enforcement officials at all government levels.

BJA's SLATT Program comprises four different components: (1) the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR), which serves as the technical service provider; (2) U.S. government agencies and organizations that assist with planning and coordination and may contribute expertise; (3) instructors who teach the training modules; and (4) a web-based educational component.

To date, the program has provided instruction to about 146,252 practitioners. To help the U.S. government better understand the nature and the value of this training, the RAND Corporation, at the request of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and BJA, assessed various aspects of the SLATT Program. The base year was dedicated to developing and refining the detailed assessment plan and collecting preliminary data, while option years 1 and 2 were dedicated to conducting the assessment. Although the participants of SLATT training vary, the focus of the assessment was on state and local law enforcement agencies.

We used a mixed-methods approach to assess the SLATT Program that included (1) conducting a literature review and review of threat assessments to analyze the terrorist threat (2) observing SLATT trainings; (3) interviewing training participants, planners, and IIR staff participants at those trainings; (4) using those observations and interviews to inform the development of the RAND Survey of SLATT Workshop Participants to capture feedback from recent training participants; and (5) conducting a cost and benefit analysis using data from a choice experiment included in the survey that asked SLATT training participants to trade off and indicate how they value the different aspects of training. We also reviewed materials on the SLATT website.

## Findings

### *Terrorism Threat Assessment Analysis*

To understand the nature of the current terrorism threat and its relevance for SLATT Program training, we reviewed general threat trends for attacks against the homeland and how law enforcement perceives these terrorism trends; we did the latter by summarizing the results of a 2014 survey by Kurzman and Schanzer and by using the results of the qualitative interviews we conducted with SLATT planners and workshop participants. Our review focused on the jihadi threat from Muslim extremists, as well as the threat from domestic terrorists.

While the United States has not suffered an attack in the past 15 years as catastrophic as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, our review of the terrorism trends show that there appears to be no significant abatement of attack attempts or attack planning since 2011. Although al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) attacks have so far proven unsuccessful on U.S. soil, the recent successful strikes by Islamic State (IS)-inspired extremists in France and Belgium should give serious cause for concern. Furthermore, IS represents a growing transnational terrorist threat to the United States that is on the upswing. These foreign fighters pose a future risk to the United States, while the immediate threat lies in IS's radicalized support base and presents a significant rise in terrorist activity in the United States. Also of concern is the growth of the sovereign citizen movement, which specifically targets law enforcement.

These trends suggest an ongoing need to ensure that state and local law enforcement receive training in this area. Although the FBI and other federal law enforcement are responsible for investigating terrorist threats, they rely on the information-sharing about terrorist threats and the detection and response by state and local law enforcement. State and local law enforcement play an important role in detecting and preventing terrorist attacks. Further, any strategy for countering violent extremism (CVE) has to go beyond the federal joint terrorism task forces (JTTFs) and will depend on strengthening local partnerships with communities and reducing barriers to sharing of information; law enforcement will be a key partner in this regard. Strom et al. (2010) estimated that 80 percent of foiled terrorist plots in the United States were discovered because of observations by state and local law enforcement or by the general public. Discoveries of terror plots during routine law enforcement investigations of seemingly ordinary crimes and criminally suspicious activity constituted the fourth-largest source of initial clues (Strom, Hollywood, and Pope, 2016).

Local and state law enforcement appreciate strategic concerns about jihadi and domestic terrorism threats to the United States, but expressed greater concern about domestic extremist groups, particularly anti-government and criminal sovereign citizen elements who seem to disproportionately target law enforcement authorities (Kurzman and Schanzer, 2015). That said, local law enforcement agencies take a judicious approach to considering threats to their jurisdictions. Based on a survey of state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies, they specifically assessed the local threat from both jihadi and domestic terrorism to be moderate

rather than severe (Kurzman and Schanzer, 2015). Indeed, such attacks are dispersed throughout much of the country, thus mitigating the individual risk to any single locality. Based on our interviews and on findings from Davis, Pollard, et al. (2010), this lessened concern, however, has not reduced state and local law enforcement's interest in counterterrorism (CT) training.

### ***Assessment of SLATT Workshops***

The RAND Survey of SLATT Workshop Participants focused on the investigative/intelligence and train-the-trainer workshops. We surveyed SLATT training participants in these two types of workshops to better understand who attends these trainings, what their training goals are, what their assessment of the different components of SLATT training is, and what differences there are between participants in regular investigative/intelligence workshops versus train-the-trainer workshops. The online survey was fielded in two waves: Wave I (December 9, 2014–January 22, 2015) and Wave II (February 22, 2015–April 10, 2015). For Wave I, we received 89 completed surveys with a response rate of  $89/169 = 53$  percent. For Wave II, 57 individuals opted into the survey, and we received 27 completed surveys, for a response rate of  $27/57 = 47$  percent. The overall response rate for the survey was 51 percent (116 completes out of 226 invites).

*Overall, we found that a majority of trainees have CT as a major responsibility of their position, suggesting that SLATT is attracting law enforcement officers who are actively engaged in this area.* Those who participated in the investigative/intelligence workshops had similar training goals to those who participated in the train-the-trainer workshops: improving their understanding of international and domestic terrorist threats, enhancing their CT investigative skills, and meeting other law enforcement professionals working in this area. Two-thirds were also interested in enhancing their CT investigative skills, and a third viewed the SLATT training or workshop as an opportunity to network with other law enforcement professionals working in this area.

*SLATT workshop participants reported that the information provided on the domestic and international terrorist threats was useful, with the investigative/intelligence workshop participants tending to rate higher the utility of this information than the train-the-trainer workshop participants did.* A higher hurdle is whether the training provided would lead participants to change their approach to terrorist threats or how they would investigate them. *Overall, 6 out of 10 workshop participants indicated that the information provided during the SLATT workshops would change their approach to international terrorist or domestic terrorist threats and/or how they might investigate them.* Still, 15 percent of investigative intelligence workshop participants and nearly 28 percent of train-the-trainer workshop participants indicated that they neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement, suggesting that, although the workshop participants may rate the information provided on terrorist threats as being useful, it was not sufficient for up to one-third of participants to necessarily change their approach to those threats and/or how they might investigate them.

*Train-the-trainer workshop participants differed in some important ways from trainees who attended the SLATT intelligence/investigative workshops.* Train-the-trainer workshops are typically one-and-a-half-day affairs intended to provide instruction to law enforcement personnel responsible for training or developing courses for their agencies and provide information and resources to assist them in doing so. Train-the-trainer workshop participants tended to be more experienced law enforcement officers (with respect to the number of years they had been in law enforcement careers), were more likely to have participated in more SLATT trainings (about 40 percent had participated in two or more SLATT trainings in the past five years, as compared with 23 percent of participants in the investigative/intelligence workshops), and were more likely to travel farther to attend the SLATT workshops. They tended to be more measured in their assessment of the usefulness of the information provided in the workshops. They also were more likely to be proactive in networking with other participants and SLATT instructors, in utilizing the SLATT website, and in sharing the information they had learned. Train-the-trainer workshop participants also used the SLATT website more and used it for a range of training and research activities. In addition, nearly two-thirds planned to use the SLATT workshop and materials to design their own courses.

As part of this assessment, we were interested in how much training participants actually used the SLATT website. *Overall, two-thirds of SLATT training participants had visited the SLATT website one to four times in the three months prior to the most recent event they had attended.* In general, train-the-trainer participants visited the SLATT website more frequently than investigative/intelligence workshop participants. Fifty-two percent of investigative/intelligence workshop participants visited the SLATT website one or two times in the three months before the most recent training they had attended, whereas 21 percent of train-the-trainer workshop participants visited it five or six times, and 9 percent visited the website seven or more times. This is not surprising given that the SLATT instructors emphasize the content of the website as a resource in the train-the-trainer workshops and that the train-the-trainer participants are interested in training other law enforcement personnel, including creating their own classes on this topic.

*The SLATT Program is broad in its reach; however, the majority of survey respondents indicated that they had participated in only one or two SLATT trainings in the past five years.* This suggests that the exposure to the information provided in the SLATT workshops is infrequent for most law enforcement personnel and not enough to assume that it will lead to actual behavioral change. More-realistic expectations may be that the SLATT workshops will help increase law enforcement's awareness and understanding of international and domestic terrorist threats and provide law enforcement with information to inform their approach to possible threats and provides important network opportunities, and that the SLATT website provides more in-depth information for those interested in learning more and provides trainers with materials and information to train other personnel within their agency.

## ***Assessment of Costs of SLATT to Law Enforcement Participants***

*The costs of SLATT training to law enforcement agencies include the direct costs of sending officers to a training and backfilling those positions and may include the indirect costs of other training forgone.* Because many agencies send only one or a few personnel to a SLATT workshop, our early interviews with training participants suggested that these costs were modest, and we determined that it was infeasible to do a formal cost survey of these agencies to capture the costs of sending one or two officers to the training. Therefore, we depended on the interviews with the planners and on self-reported information from the survey of workshop participants to get some initial insights on the costs of SLATT training to law enforcement.

*SLATT workshops are offered at no cost to law enforcement (i.e., SLATT does not charge registration fees for law enforcement or other stakeholders to attend its trainings).* The SLATT planners we interviewed commented that, while CT training, in general, must compete with other law enforcement agencies' priorities, SLATT helps ensure that this type of training is reaching state and local law enforcement by providing it free to participants. The planners also commented that SLATT training further supported their overall preparedness goals for terrorism and supported other training they did in this area, noting that the no-cost aspect was very important to agencies' being able to have personnel participate in the SLATT trainings. Indeed, some planners expressed real concern that, if SLATT training was canceled or no longer funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, it would reduce their ability to train state and local law enforcement on terrorist threats and, in their view, would send a message that the federal government did not prioritize law enforcement training in this area.

*However, SLATT trainings are not completely without cost for law enforcement. The law enforcement agencies and other justice entities that host the SLATT trainings incur some costs in terms of working with IIR to plan the event, marketing the training, and providing the venue and logistical support for these workshops.* In addition, the survey respondents reported some minor travel costs associated with attending the workshops. For example, for those participants who reported that they were fully reimbursed by their department, the reported expenses ranged from \$12 to \$22 per person, on average, for the train-the-trainer and investigative/intelligence workshop participants, respectively. For those who reported that they were not fully reimbursed for their travel expenses by their department, the reported expenses ranged on average from \$86 (investigative/intelligence workshop participants) to \$168 (train-the-trainer workshop participants). The greater costs for train-the-trainer workshop participants may be partly because a greater proportion of these respondents—42 percent (compared with 14 percent of the investigative/intelligence workgroup participants)—indicated that they had traveled over 100 miles to attend the SLATT training and, therefore, incurred food, travel, and accommodation expenses about two times that of the investigative/intelligence workgroup.

Further, participants reported spending approximately 2.5 to 3 working days (investigative/intelligence workshops) and approximately 2.3 to 2.6 days (train-the-trainer

workshops) away from their normal law enforcement duties to attend the SLATT workshops. Thirty percent of participants of the investigative/intelligence workshops reported that their shift was covered by a colleague regularly paid (i.e., not overtime pay), while between 50 and 57 percent reported their shift was not covered at all. Between 10 and 27 percent of the train-the-trainer workshop participants reported that their shift was covered by a colleague regularly paid, while 62–84 percent of the train-the-trainer workshop participants reported that their shift was not covered.

### ***Assessing Features and the Value of SLATT to Participants***

Our analysis of the costs of SLATT to participants and how they value different features of the training is based on a discrete choice experiment (a technique for quantifying the perceived benefits in terms of “willingness to pay”) included in the survey to understand how participants valued different aspects of the trainings. The choice experiment varied four attributes—distance traveled, registration costs if the hosting agencies requested them, focus on domestic or international terrorist threats, and length of the training. Simply put, the choice experiment provides information for BJA and for planners as to what factors help draw or incentivize law enforcement personnel to participate in SLATT workshops.

*We found that, across the two types of workshop participants, a three-day training was most valued, followed by a two-day training, suggesting that the optimal number of days for a SLATT workshop is three days.* This result generally held even when we examined the investigative/intelligence group and the train-the-trainer groups separately.

*In terms of the distance participants are willing to travel, investigative/intelligence and train-the-trainer workshop participants preferred to travel less than 100 miles away from home, suggesting that event planners can expect to draw law enforcement personnel within a 100-mile radius or less.* In fact, overall, workshop participants would be willing to pay (or request for their department to pay) \$170 as a registration fee to attend a workshop that was nearby rather than to travel over 100 miles. Investigative/intelligence workshop participants valued having the training within a 100-mile radius more than the train-the-trainer workshop participants did. Specifically, investigative/intelligence workshop participants would be willing to pay (or request their department to pay) on average \$252 as a registration fee to attend a workshop that was less than 100 miles away, whereas the train-the-trainer workshop participants would be willing to pay \$136.

*Although investigative/intelligence workshop participants preferred a program with both domestic and international terrorist topics, they valued having the training include local examples of the terrorist threat in their region or jurisdiction more than the train-the-trainer workshop participants did.* Train-the-trainer workshop participants, in general, preferred workshops to be not as long in duration and to be more focused on specific content. They also valued learning about both international and domestic terrorist threats, but placed less value on having local examples.

## Suggestions for Improving the SLATT Program and Future Assessments

Overall, the planners we interviewed and the SLATT training participants we surveyed had a favorable impression of the SLATT trainings and workshops they had participated in. It appears that SLATT is attracting law enforcement officers to these trainings whose major responsibility is CT and who are actively engaged in this area. Given this, our focus here is on some suggestions for improving BJA's SLATT Program that are centered on the key findings above. Table S.1 briefly lists suggestions by topic area. Additional context for these suggestions and more detail on them is provided in Chapter Six. We conclude with a summary of next steps.

### *Suggestions for Improving the SLATT Program*

**Table S.1. Summary of Suggestions for Improving the SLATT Program, by Topic Area**

Topic Area	Suggestions for Improving the SLATT Program
SLATT planning and assessment process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pursue a strategy of broadly reaching the law enforcement community while striking a balance between (1) having SLATT training needs driven from the bottom up (i.e., localities and regions determine what their terrorism-related training needs are and what topics would be particularly germane to law enforcement) and (2) SLATT training being driven from the top down, where IIR, in consultation with the FBI, determines what type of training is needed based on the threat and which jurisdictions to prioritize for the SLATT trainings.</li> <li>• Consider (IIR) the right mix of emphasis on international vs. domestic terrorist threats for the different types of workshops.</li> <li>• Consider ways to more formally engage representatives from the USAOs, local FBI, and JTTFs and have them participate on a panel about local threats.</li> </ul>
SLATT trainings and workshops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Devote more effort to understanding how to facilitate networking opportunities among law enforcement in general at trainings. A local threat panel is one avenue for facilitating networking opportunities. Other opportunities include having event planners organize no-host socials that give attending officers, especially those traveling from out of town, an opportunity to socialize and interact outside the formal training venue.</li> <li>• Prioritize train-the-trainer workshops as one way to extend the reach of the SLATT training to law enforcement.</li> <li>• Provide train-the-trainer workshop participants with dedicated workshop time and guidance on how to build and design a briefing or course based on the content provided and to get feedback from instructors on their examples.</li> <li>• Follow up with the train-the-trainer group to gather data on what was actually done in terms of developing courses, training other law enforcement personnel, and other actions that were taken.</li> <li>• Target marketing efforts for training workshops at leaders in law enforcement agencies (e.g., commander, captain, or chief) and disseminate information about upcoming training opportunities through the SLATT website and newsletter, as well as through the state or regional JTTF, to reach trainers about upcoming SLATT trainings.</li> </ul>
SLATT website	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assess how law enforcement uses the SLATT website and its potential for building a community of interest.</li> <li>• Regularly monitor the usage and reach of the website to understand how it can be more effectively tied into trainings.</li> <li>• Assess the administrative costs associated with maintaining and regularly updating the website.</li> </ul>

### *Suggestions for Further Assessing the SLATT Program*

In terms of suggestions for further assessing the SLATT Program, we identified the following. With the exception of our comparison between participants in the investigative/intelligence workshops versus train-the-trainer workshops, we were unable to answer the question of how different types of personnel—e.g., federal law enforcement versus state and local law enforcement, law enforcement personnel from jurisdictions with a higher risk of terrorism versus those from jurisdictions with lower risk—differed in their assessment of the quality and value of the SLATT training. Future assessments may want to consider these types of comparisons.

The survey we conducted asked SLATT training participants whether within the few months following the training they had undertaken any of the following actions: (1) changed how they approach and/or investigate domestic and international terrorist threats; (2) contacted other workshop participants or instructors to share information or request additional information; (3) shared the information that they had learned with other law enforcement colleagues; and (4) used the SLATT website and for what purpose. A number of workshop participants reported that it did change their approach to terrorist threats and how they investigated these different types of threats; however, we had no way to verify what specific actions were undertaken as a result. A follow-up assessment should collect such information and perhaps focus specifically on the train-the-trainer workshop participants to gather data on how they used the SLATT training and website information to develop courses for their agencies, how many law enforcement personnel they have trained, how those personnel have used the information, and what additional training and information needs trainers may have.

The content of the SLATT courses across the different workshops tended to be similar, and the courses were taught for the most part by the same set of instructors with experience in CT. It was beyond the scope of this assessment to evaluate the instructors themselves or the quality of their instruction. IIR evaluates new instructors, providing them with feedback on their instructional approach and briefings, and tries to keep the material updated as the terrorism landscape changes. Although the instructors' résumés suggested that they have the relevant expertise, a more formal assessment of the instruction provided by SLATT instructors and the consistency of the message on different aspects of CT would be worthwhile.

In terms of costs, we utilized information from the interviews with planners and on the self-reported information from the survey of workshop participants to get some initial insights on the costs of SLATT training to law enforcement. We did not formally assess the costs to planners and host agencies of the trainings; future assessments might wish to quantify the costs associated with planning, marketing to and recruiting law enforcement participants, and hosting the workshops (which includes finding a venue and the associated logistical support) to get a complete picture of the law enforcement direct costs of SLATT training.

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Last, we appreciate the insights provided by our RAND reviewers—one internal reviewer and two external reviewers. We also appreciate the input from two anonymous reviewers from the National Institute of Justice.

# 1. Introduction

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## Role of Law Enforcement in Counterterrorism

Vital to the nation's efforts to uncover and thwart domestic terrorist plots are the nearly 18,000 state and local U.S. law enforcement agencies that collectively play a key role in the counterterrorism (CT) process (Strom et al., 2010). Law enforcement officers are often viewed as the first-line preventers to terrorism-related incidents (Kelling and Bratton, 2006). Based on an analysis of 86 identified terrorist plots against U.S. targets between 1999 and 2009, Strom et al. (2010) estimated that 80 percent of the foiled terrorist plots were discovered via observations by state and local law enforcement or by the general public. Tips included reports of plots, as well as reports of suspicious activity, such as pre-operational surveillance, paramilitary training, smuggling activities, and the discovery of suspicious documents. Strom, Hollywood, and Pope (2016) updated this analysis to include 150 executed and foiled terrorist plots against U.S. targets between 1999 and 2012 and found that discoveries of terror plots during routine law enforcement investigations of seemingly ordinary crimes and criminally suspicious activity constituted the fourth-largest source of initial clues. Dahl (2011) conducted an analysis of 176 thwarted terrorist plots against American targets between 1987 and 2010 that included overseas plots. Similar to Strom et al. (2010), Dahl (2011) concluded that plots were most often foiled through conventional law enforcement activities.

The nexus between the detection and investigation of routine crime and terrorism-related activity has been recognized by law enforcement. Strom et al. (2010) noted that one in five thwarted plots were foiled "accidentally" as a result of investigations into seemingly unrelated crimes. Davis, Pollard, et al.'s (2010) case studies of five major law enforcement agencies' CT efforts nine years following the 9/11 terrorist attacks found that these agencies tended to define *terrorism* broadly, citing the linkage between criminal activities and terrorism-related activities. For instance, representatives from one law enforcement agency discussed its all-crimes approach to CT using the example that drug trafficking, organized crime, or white-collar crime may turn out to have a terrorist nexus, with such illegal activities being used possibly to fund terrorist groups or activities. Another agency noted that increasing its presence at an international airport for homeland security reasons had a spillover effect of helping to reduce crime in general in this location. This agency reported an 80 percent decrease in theft following an increase in the number of law enforcement personnel assigned to the airport for homeland security purposes (Davis, Pollard, et al., 2010). Indeed, nine years following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the information-sharing networks developed by the fusion centers in the five metropolitan areas studied by Davis, Pollard, et al. (2010) reported having adopted an all-crimes approach, with the goal of striking a balance between criminal intelligence and terrorism-related intelligence. The

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2007) interviewed staff from a number of fusion centers and found that a common explanation for adopting this broader focus to include criminal activity in general was the recognition of the nexus of many crimes (e.g., drug crime) with terrorism-related activities. Further, homeland security grants call for a regional, multi-jurisdictional approach to preparedness and the adoption of an all-crimes, all-hazards approach to information-sharing and intelligence analysis (Davis, Pollard, et al., 2010).

State and local law enforcement play somewhat different roles with respect to CT and homeland security. For instance, a 50-state survey by the Council of State Governments (CSG) and Eastern Kentucky University conducted in 2004 highlighted the range of state-level homeland security responsibilities that state law enforcement agencies have (Foster and Cordner, 2005). Approximately 75 percent of state agencies indicated that they had a great amount of involvement with or actually served as their state's leader for terrorism-related intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination. More than 50 percent of state agencies reported a similar amount of involvement in homeland security planning and coordination at the state level, conducting vulnerability assessments of critical infrastructure, conducting law enforcement training, and emergency response to terrorism-related incidents. State law enforcement agencies also were more likely than local agencies to report allocating more resources to intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing; security for critical infrastructure, special events, and dignitaries; and commercial vehicle enforcement. Large local law enforcement agencies (more than 300 uniformed personnel) also reported that their officers had significant new responsibilities in conducting terrorism-related intelligence gathering and investigations. Local law enforcement agencies in general were more likely to indicate allocating more or much more resources to community policing, drug enforcement, and traditional criminal investigation (Foster and Cordner, 2005).

The above findings suggest that state and local law enforcement personnel need to be trained on how to recognize possible indicators of terrorism-related activity, on investigating such activity, on reporting suspicious activities, and on the threat to their region or locality. In the course of routine law enforcement duties or criminal investigations, an officer who has an increased awareness of the domestic and international terrorist threats for his or her jurisdiction or region and who is trained to identify, investigate, and report suspicious activities will be better positioned to serve that "first-line preventer" role (Strom et al., 2010).

## Overview of the SLATT Program

The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) created in 1996 the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program to focus on the prevention of terrorism by providing training to state, local, and tribal law enforcement officers on how to understand, detect, deter, and investigate acts of terrorism and violent criminal extremism by international and domestic terrorists and extremists (BJA, no date). Since 1996, the program has trained more than 146,252 law

enforcement professionals in every state in the United States (U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ], Office of Justice Programs, no date). In addition, 3,479 individuals have attended SLATT's train-the-trainer workshops, who in turn have provided training to 268,597 individuals (personal communication with SLATT Program director R. Marquise, September 9, 2016).

BJA awarded a competitive grant to the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR) to serve as the technical service provider for the SLATT Program. IIR provides ongoing training, research, and analysis services for SLATT.<sup>1</sup> SLATT training includes (BJA, no date)

- on-site training (e.g., investigative/intelligence workshops, specialized workshops that cover a range of topics, instruction at law enforcement meetings, stand-alone sessions at conferences)
- train-the-trainer workshops aimed at law enforcement trainers and intended to assist in the development of in-house anti-terrorism training capabilities for law enforcement agencies
- online training modules and webinars that SLATT trainees can access via the password-protected SLATT website
- customized technical assistance.

In addition, SLATT's website contains a virtual library with training videos and briefings, academic articles, the *SLATT Bulletin*, articles by SLATT trainers, and the Terrorism Incident Database. Training participants have access to the password-protected website to augment and reinforce the in-person training they may have received (BJA, no date).

BJA's SLATT Program also is designed to support the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI), which is a collaborative effort by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement partners. The NSI provides law enforcement with a standardized process for identifying and reporting suspicious activity in jurisdictions and is intended to serve as the unified focal point for sharing suspicious activity reporting information. State and urban fusion centers serve as the primary focal points at the state and local levels for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information among state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement and federal partners. As described below, SLATT, as part of its training, also invites representatives from U.S. Attorney's Offices (USAOs), the FBI and its joint terrorism task forces (JTTFs), and the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Program<sup>2</sup> to present and to network with the law enforcement training participants.

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<sup>1</sup> IIR is a Florida-based nonprofit corporation that provides training and specialized technical assistance services to law enforcement and the public safety sector. IIR specializes in criminal justice, homeland security, and juvenile justice issues. IIR receives grants from BJA to support the SLATT Program (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2016).

<sup>2</sup> The RISS Program is congressionally funded and administered by BJA. The RISS Program supports efforts against organized and violent crime, gang activity, drug activity, terrorism, human trafficking, identity theft, and other regional priorities (RISS, 2016). RISS supports three major areas: (1) information- and intelligence-sharing, (2) officer safety and deconfliction, and (3) investigative and case support (RISS, 2015). The RISS Program consists

## *Evolution of SLATT over Time*

Following the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in 1995, the U.S. Attorney General asked BJA to develop a CT training program for law enforcement in the United States. The SLATT Program was developed in conjunction with the FBI and was designed to provide instruction to enable state, local, and tribal law enforcement to recognize the precursor indicators of terrorist activity so as to help prevent acts of terrorism in the United States (BJA, no date).

During its initial years, the SLATT Program focused predominantly on domestic terrorism issues (personal communication, IIR director). In 1999 and 2000, and following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, SLATT's anti-terrorism training was expanded to include both an international and a domestic focus. Before 9/11, CT had been the purview of the federal government, with the FBI assuming the lion's share of responsibility.<sup>3</sup> However, following 9/11, New York City, arguably, led the charge of sizable U.S. cities clamoring to assume more responsibility for protecting their citizens and critical infrastructure.<sup>4</sup> The primary goal of the SLATT Program is closely aligned with this post-9/11 paradigm shift—to provide instruction to state, local, and tribal law enforcement so they can (1) identify indicators themselves and (2) create and leverage necessary relationships with people in their communities to address critical terrorist threats.<sup>5</sup> The BJA SLATT Program's training priorities have also evolved over time to address emerging trends, such as homegrown violent extremism (HVE) and the sovereign citizen movement.<sup>6</sup>

Awareness of SLATT training by law enforcement and how it fits into other training priorities is a key consideration. Just before and following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, RAND researchers conducted a series of nationwide surveys of state and local law enforcement agencies to assess their preparedness for terrorism. Thirty-seven percent of state law enforcement agencies and 23 percent of local law enforcement agencies reported participating in SLATT training following 9/11 (Davis, Riley, et al., 2004). A 2010 study by Davis, Pollard, et al. found that, nine years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, investing in CT training and in CT in general had become a

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of six regional centers and supports efforts against crime and terrorism in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, U.S. territories, Australia, Canada, England, and New Zealand. The six RISS regional centers are the Regional Organized Crime Information Center (ROCIC), Middle Atlantic–Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network (MAGLOCEN), New England State Police Information Network (NESPIN), Mid-States Organized Crime Information Center (MOCIC), Rocky Mountain Information Network (RMIN), and the Western States Information Network (WSIN).

<sup>3</sup> Interview with the SLATT Program director, May 5, 2015.

<sup>4</sup> Interview with the SLATT Program director, May 5, 2015.

<sup>5</sup> Interview with the SLATT Program director, May 5, 2015.

<sup>6</sup> Sovereign citizens are anti-government extremists who believe that, even though they physically reside in the United States, they are separate or “sovereign” from the United States. They believe that they do not have to answer to any government authority, including courts, taxing entities, motor vehicle departments, and law enforcement (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010).

lower priority for some major urban law enforcement agencies. CT and SLATT training must compete with other law enforcement training demands and with other priorities within a department, such as addressing gang crime or violent crime in a region. All of the five law enforcement agencies studied indicated that the officers in CT or homeland security positions typically are mid-career officers who are highly motivated to get into this area, and they often self-select into these positions. Developing CT expertise, though, requires a substantial up-front investment by these agencies to enable these officers to undertake the specialized training and spend the time necessary to develop their knowledge and expertise in this area and to develop the contacts and information-sharing networks needed to be effective in these positions. As one commander noted, it can take a mid-career officer at least two years to become effective in CT. Further, a challenge that law enforcement faces is how to keep current and maintain the training that officers receive. Many law enforcement officers who are assigned to CT or homeland security positions rotate out of those positions within two to three years to keep advancing professionally within the agency. Thus, the expertise and knowledge that these officers have gained must continually be renewed as new personnel fill these critical positions in CT units or homeland security bureaus. This suggests that there is an ongoing need for law enforcement training in CT and homeland security and for training that is low-cost, such as SLATT provides for CT.

### *Composition of the SLATT Program*

BJA's SLATT Program is composed of four different components: (1) IIR, which serves as the technical service provider; (2) U.S. government agencies and organizations that initiate requests for training, assist with planning and coordination, and serve as hosts for the training event; (3) IIR-contracted instructors who teach the training modules; and (4) a web-based educational component.

Requests for SLATT training can come from a variety of sources. Requests for SLATT training are initiated by criminal justice agencies in a particular locality or region, as well as by SLATT leadership. The IIR team works with the requesting agencies to identify terror-related concerns and training needs and then consults with the program's subject-matter experts to customize the training to meet the training needs and goals identified by the host agencies.

SLATT training addresses the areas of detection, investigation, and interdiction. Table 1.1 illustrates the type of topics SLATT training includes under each category.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> In addition, BJA requires that all SLATT training and technical assistance include the protection of individual privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties throughout the intelligence process and law enforcement's constitutional responsibilities in this area (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, no date).

**Table 1.1. Examples of Topics Addressed by SLATT Training**

Topic	Description
Detection	<p><i>Recognizing Terrorist Indicators and Warning Signs:</i> Provides an overview of warning signs and indicators that law enforcement officers can use as they perform their day-to-day duties and explores how to identify those early warning signs often exhibited by criminal extremist groups and individuals.</p> <p><i>Domestic Terrorism:</i> Discusses motivations of violent criminal extremists driven by events occurring in the United States. Discussion includes criminal threats from militias, sovereign citizens, and white supremacists, as well as single-issue terrorism. Course also examines investigation, response, and officer safety strategies for identifying and managing domestic criminal extremist cases.</p> <p><i>Explosives, Methods, and Attacks:</i> Examines peripheral information associated with explosive materials and chemicals and their relationship to terrorist activity. Includes importance of sharing information with the JTTFs or fusion centers; types of explosives, including their manufacturing and delivery; and strategies to detect and identify future violators.</p>
Investigation	<p><i>Conducting the Interview and Interrogation:</i> Provides fundamental topics for preparing for high-impact subject interviews. Presents the theory of interrogation and defines several methods of conducting interrogations that have led to positive outcomes. Geared toward law enforcement practitioners whose duties include interviewing and interrogation.</p> <p><i>Intelligence-Led Policing:</i> Discusses intelligence practices to anticipate, prevent, and interdict criminal and terrorist activities. Aim is to increase participants' understanding of how they can utilize the practice of intelligence-led policing for terrorism-related activities.</p> <p><i>Preventing Terrorism Through Impostor Detection and Fraudulent ID Training:</i> Discusses identity theft as it relates to criminal and terrorist acts and how criminals and terrorists use fraudulent IDs. Includes information about security features used on driver's licenses, U.S. passports and permanent resident cards, and other federal and state documents and information about the detection of impostors via facial recognition techniques.</p> <p><i>Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing:</i> Provides an overview of money laundering and terrorism finance. Discusses of common methodologies and resources to "follow the money trail."</p>
Interdiction	<p><i>Violent Criminal Extremism in the Prison System:</i> Explores how law enforcement can incorporate the intelligence potential from correctional departments into criminal cases, including those that involve terrorism.</p> <p><i>Radicalization on College Campuses:</i> Focuses on the process by which individuals become involved in radical movements. Discusses how and why radicalization occurs, its progressive stages and associated indicators, and techniques for identification and prevention/interdiction of radicalization on campus.</p> <p><i>Terrorism Financing:</i> Examines law enforcement methodology for obtaining information from the banking industry, conducting a financial criminal investigation, and preparing a source and application of funds to use for forfeiture warrants and search warrants.</p>

SOURCE: BJA, no date.

The different types of SLATT workshops are designed to address different needs. Table 1.2 provides examples of the different topics addressed in these workshops. *Investigative/intelligence workshops* typically consist of a two-and-a-half-day course for law enforcement investigators, intelligence officers, and analytical personnel on topics inherent to the investigation and prosecution of terrorists and criminal extremists. *Advanced investigative/intelligence workshops* are typically one to two days long and are intended to provide instruction on specific topics as requested by a locality or region, such as intelligence, investigative techniques, or countersurveillance. *Specialized workshops* vary in length (e.g., from

four hours to several days), and the topics are tailored to the specific needs of the requesting agency. *Train-the-trainer workshops* are typically one-and-a-half-days long, designed for law enforcement trainers, and intended to assist agencies in developing in-house anti-terrorism training capabilities. In addition to instruction, trainers receive an electronic instructor guide and access to the SLATT website to obtain current information to keep their presentations updated. Of particular relevance to our study, as discussed in Chapters Four and Five, are the *investigative/intelligence workshops* and *train-the-trainer workshops*. In all of the different types of workshops, typically included is a local panel composed of representatives from the USAO, local FBI and/or JTTF, the state criminal intelligence center, etc., that focuses on issues specific to that locality or region. In addition, the goal is help bring together law enforcement and representatives from these other entities to facilitate networking.

A goal of the SLATT Program is to train law enforcement within a particular region, with the aim of drawing training participants widely from across a region. In addition, the SLATT Program will invite representatives from the USAOs, the FBI, JTTFs, and the RISS Program to the training to participate in and present information during the course. These various actors also may help coordinate the SLATT training event.

**Table 1.2. Overview of the Different Types of SLATT Workshops**

	<b>Description</b>	<b>Sample Training Agenda</b>
Investigative/ intelligence workshops	Typically a two-and-a-half-day course for law enforcement investigators, intelligence officers, and analytical personnel on topics inherent to the investigation and prosecution of terrorists and criminal extremists.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International terrorism in post-9/11 world</li> <li>• Terrorism indicators</li> <li>• Preparing and conducting the interview and interrogation</li> <li>• 10 critical factors to know about law enforcement intelligence (LEI)</li> <li>• Domestic terrorism/sovereign citizens overview</li> <li>• Understanding the sovereign citizen threat</li> <li>• Investigating illegitimate financial tactics</li> <li>• Preventing terrorism through impostor detection and fraudulent ID training</li> <li>• Explosives, chemicals, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and methods of terrorists</li> </ul>
	<i>Advanced investigative/intelligence workshops</i> typically one to two days in length and intended to provide instruction on specific topics as requested by a locality or region, such as intelligence, investigative techniques, or countersurveillance.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Terrorism overview</li> <li>• Introduction to money laundering and terrorism financing</li> <li>• Bank's role in financial crimes</li> <li>• Trade-based money laundering</li> <li>• Scams to fund terror</li> <li>• The Internet: money laundering and fraud via cyber payments</li> <li>• Alternative remittance systems/Hawala</li> <li>• Preventing terrorism through impostor detection and fraudulent ID training</li> </ul>
Train-the-trainer workshops	Typically one-and-a-half-day workshops designed for law enforcement trainers and intended to assist agencies in developing in-house anti-terrorism training capabilities. In addition to instruction, trainers receive an electronic instructor guide and other resources, as well as access to the SLATT website to help develop their own in-house training and to obtain current information to keep their presentations updated. Instructors also review in detail the SLATT website so that trainees are aware of what resources are available to them as they develop their own courses and briefings.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Anti-terrorism training resources</li> <li>• Terrorism indicators</li> <li>• International terrorism</li> <li>• Domestic terrorism</li> <li>• Law enforcement intelligence</li> <li>• FBI's eGuardian system</li> <li>• Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC)</li> <li>• FBI JTTF</li> <li>• Terrorist screening center</li> </ul>
Specialized workshops	Vary in length (e.g., from four hours to several days), with the topics tailored to the specific needs of the requesting agency.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Explosives, chemicals, MANPADS, and methods of terrorists</li> <li>• Investigating illegitimate financial tactics</li> <li>• Preventing terrorism through impostor detection and fraudulent ID training</li> <li>• Recognizing terrorism indicators and warning signs</li> <li>• Understanding the sovereign citizen movement and threat</li> <li>• International terrorism in the post-9/11 world</li> <li>• The psychopathology of hate groups</li> </ul>

NOTES: Descriptions of the sample training agendas are based on the Marriottsville, Maryland, March 5–7, 2014, investigative intelligence workshop; Hot Springs, Arkansas, June 10–11, 2014, advanced investigative/intelligence workshop; Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, October 1–2, 2014, and Los Angeles, California, June 24–25, 2015, train-the-trainer workshops; and the Columbia, South Carolina, September 11, 2014, and Scottsbluff, Nebraska, August 7–8, 2013, specialized workshops.

Requests for SLATT training are typically initiated by USAOs and/or by law enforcement or other criminal justice agencies in a locality or region. IIR then works with the requesting agency to tailor the training to meet the needs for a particular region or jurisdiction and to determine the training priorities in terms of terror-related concerns. IIR then develops the curriculum for a particular workshop in conjunction with the hosting agency. The requesting agencies or offices serve as the host and are responsible for finding a location for the training and for advertising the training in their region. If the host agency is not a USAO, SLATT typically asks that it partner with the local USAO and arrange to have that office serve as an event co-host. Examples of the type of hosts and co-hosts for SLATT events that we attended during the study period included

- USAOs
- state law enforcement officers' associations, state or county sheriff's associations
- state police or state patrol
- state departments of public safety
- governor's offices of crime control and prevention, public safety, or criminal justice
- the RISS Program
- other state or regional law enforcement information networks or analysis centers
- FBI JTTFs
- state or regional fusion centers
- police training commissions
- local universities or colleges.

The SLATT Program does not charge for training, and so typically the only direct costs to law enforcement are the costs of sending officers to the training and backfilling their positions, as well as travel-related costs. Indirect costs may include other training opportunities forgone to participate in SLATT. The event hosts may also arrange for education credits for those attending the training.

SLATT instructors include individuals with direct CT experience. Many are retired law enforcement officials with more than 15–20 years of practical field experiences; others have staffed or led a variety of interagency counternarcotic, CT, or counterintelligence task forces. As noted by BJA (no date), "SLATT instructors have worked on many of the most notorious terrorism cases, and their personal law enforcement experience helps the audience connect with them." The instructors are employed as personal contractors by IIR residing "off-site" and traveling to the various SLATT events to teach the curricula.

Lastly, law enforcement personnel and other SLATT trainees gain access to the SLATT website when they register for their course (SLATT homepage, 2016). In addition to the course materials provided at the training, the site (as noted above) offers an array of training and education materials. It is intended to augment the information provided at each training. In addition, the website contains information about upcoming courses and is the primary vehicle by which an individual registers for SLATT training.

## *Other Law Enforcement Training Opportunities*

How does the SLATT Program fit into the larger picture of what federal government training opportunities are available to state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies? As indicated above, at the federal level, BJA funds and manages the SLATT Program. In addition, DHS's State and Local Law Enforcement Resource Catalog (DHS, 2016) highlights a number of DHS resources available to state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement, including training offered by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). FLETC is the federal government's principal provider of interagency training of federal law enforcement personnel.<sup>8</sup> FLETC also offers specialized training courses to over 80 partner organizations and to state, local, tribal, campus, and international law enforcement officers and agents. FLETC's training courses cover a wide range of topics and, like SLATT's, are tuition-free.<sup>9</sup> Also at the federal level, the Homeland Security Grant Program, which is composed of three grant programs—the State Homeland Security Program, Urban Areas Security Initiative, and Operation Stonegarden—also supports a range of preparedness activities, including planning, organization, equipment purchase, training, exercises, and management and administration.

From our perspective, BJA's SLATT Program fills the role of focusing on what state, local, and tribal law enforcement officers engaged in routine law enforcement duties need to know in order to be effective first responders, as well as understanding how to share intelligence and threat information with the JTTFs and other justice entities within their jurisdiction or region. SLATT also aims to bring together law enforcement representatives within a region, as well as the other key federal entities responsible for homeland security and terrorism, to facilitate networking and awareness of each other. SLATT's train-the-trainer workshops are geared to providing the instruction, course materials, and other resources to trainers who can then develop briefings and courses for their law enforcement agency. SLATT focuses trainings not at the agency level per se, but rather on bringing together for training law enforcement agencies within a region or across jurisdictions—an approach consistent with the regional, multi-jurisdictional approach to preparedness noted earlier.

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<sup>8</sup> FLETC's strategic plan (DHS, 2007) indicates that a goal is to continue to revise and develop training programs for export delivery to state, local, tribal, and campus law enforcement agencies with emerging programs, including anti-terrorism intelligence training with a special emphasis on training law enforcement officers from small-town and rural agencies, which comprise 95 percent of the state, local, tribal, and campus law enforcement population.

<sup>9</sup> A search of the FLETC training catalog for training related to terrorism identified such specialized training courses as anti-terrorism training for boat operators, land transportation, or seaport security, as well as a commercial vehicle CT training program, protective services operation training program, and Wi-Fi tools for analysis and geocoding. FLETC also offers an active-shooter threat training program, money laundering and asset forfeiture training program, computer and Internet investigative training programs, and a law enforcement first-responder training program, among other introductory and specialized training programs.

## Study's Objective and Scope

To help the U.S. government better understand the nature and the value of this training, the RAND Corporation, at the request of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and BJA, assessed various aspects of the SLATT Program; the base year was dedicated to developing and refining the detailed assessment plan and collecting preliminary data, while option years 1 and 2 were dedicated to conducting the assessment. Although SLATT provides a range of different types of training, as detailed above, the focus of our assessment was on investigative/intelligence workshops and train-the-trainer workshops. One reason for this was that these workshops tend to reach a larger number of law enforcement personnel than some of the other more specialized or targeted training offered by SLATT. In addition, although SLATT is aimed at a wide range of law enforcement personnel, including prosecutorial authorities, in agreement with NIJ and BJA, the focus of our assessment is understanding the value and benefit of SLATT to state and local law enforcement agencies.

Our study questions were as follows:

1. How are sites selected for training?
2. How are the trainings planned and the curricula determined?
3. Who participates in the investigative/intelligence and train-the-trainer workshops?
4. What are participants' views regarding these workshops, and how do they differ by type of workshop?
5. What factors facilitate or hinder law enforcement's participation in SLATT?
6. What behavioral changes do participants report as a result of SLATT training?
7. What are the costs and benefits of SLATT training to participants?
8. What insights and suggestions can be derived from the assessment to improve the SLATT Program?

In addition, to put the training in context, we also describe what the threat picture looks like and what types of threats law enforcement are most focused on.

## Approach

We used a mixed-methods approach to assess the SLATT Program. We attended SLATT workshops conducted in 2013, 2014, and the spring of 2015. As noted above, during the base year (2012/2013), we first observed several SLATT workshops and collected preliminary data in order to develop and refine our assessment plan and to collect preliminary data.

In 2014 and 2015, we conducted our formal assessment. In determining which workshops to attend and to collect data on, we sought to achieve variation in the types of workshops, the geographic regions covered, and the types of training participants. In addition to observing the training itself, we conducted in-person interviews with participants, planners, and IIR staff to understand the training goals of SLATT participants, costs incurred by law enforcement personnel to attend the trainings, how the trainings were planned, and how the investigative/intelligence workshops differed from train-the-trainer workshops.

These observations and interviews informed the development of the RAND Survey of SLATT Workshop Participants, which was designed to capture feedback from individuals who had recently participated in the investigative/intelligence workshops and the train-the-trainer workshops on participants' characteristics, their goals for the training, how they learned about the training, and their assessment of the content of the training and its different components, as well as their utilization of the SLATT website. In addition, these interviews informed the development of a choice experiment included in the survey that was designed to get training participants to trade off and indicate how they value different aspects of the training.

These observations and interviews also informed the development of an interview protocol used to conduct in-person and telephone interviews with planners and with IIR staff to understand the planning process.

In addition, we conducted a review of threat assessments that was used in our analysis of the terrorist threat. Finally, we also reviewed the SLATT website and obtained web usage data from IIR to provide background information on the content of the website and current usage.

Taken together, the information collected was used to assess the SLATT Program overall and informed the suggestions we have for improving the program. Chapters Three, Four, and Five contain more detailed information about the methods used.

## Study's Limitations

The SLATT trainings are developed depending on what requests are received from the field. Our goal of achieving variation in the focus, type, and geographic trainings depended on how the requests from state and local law enforcement evolved over time. For example, it was not until 2014 that we were able to observe and collect data on train-the-trainer workshops, because they were not offered in the initial years of data collection. The extent to which the 2014–2015 train-the-trainer workshops were not representative of those previously conducted by the SLATT Program might limit the generalizability of our results for this workshop type. However, we have no reason to believe that these train-the-trainer workshops significantly differed from those offered in previous years.

The RAND Survey of SLATT Workshop Participants asked respondents whether the information they learned as part of the SLATT training changed how they approach and/or investigate domestic or international terrorist threats; whether they contacted other training participants or instructors to share information or request additional information; whether they shared the information from the training with other law enforcement colleagues; and whether they access the SLATT website and for what purpose. We were unable to verify that the actions reported were indeed undertaken nor whether *actual changes* were made in investigative techniques or whether the SLATT training helped increase collaboration between law enforcement and the JTTFs or other federal entities within a region. To the extent that participants actually implemented what was learned in these trainings and workshops is

unmeasured and thus a limitation of our study; however, we have no reason to assume that the survey participants over- or underreported actions taken.

Altogether, we surveyed participants from five SLATT trainings and workshops conducted in the latter half of 2014 and early 2015. Of the 43 SLATT trainings offered between March 2014 and January 2015, the majority were one-day specialized workshops. Five were investigative/intelligence or advance investigative/intelligence workshops and four were train-the-trainer workshops. We surveyed participants from two out of the five investigative/intelligence workshops and from three out of the four train-the-trainer workshops offered during this time period. We were unable to assess the degree to which these trainings and workshops may be representative overall of the range of SLATT training and workshops provided within the past three to five years. The degree to which these trainings are not representative may limit our ability to generalize these findings to SLATT workshops overall.

We were unable to gather data from other law enforcement agencies within a region that did not participate in the SLATT training offered during the course of this study. Doing so would have required a national survey of state and local law enforcement agencies to gather their perspective on their training needs, their assessment of SLATT if they had participated, and their assessment of how SLATT fits into the broader context of law enforcement training needs in this area. Unfortunately, fielding such a survey was cost-prohibitive and outside the scope of this study. To the extent that we are missing the perspective of these nonparticipating law enforcement agencies, this is a potential study limitation.

In assessing SLATT costs, our original plan was to develop a cost survey of law enforcement agencies that had sent personnel to these trainings to collect actual cost data. However, what we learned from the preliminary data collection in the base year suggested that such a survey would be infeasible. For any particular training, many law enforcement agencies might send one or several officers. Thus, for one workshop alone, we would have had to survey a number of law enforcement agencies and ask them to fill out a detailed cost survey that addressed only a few officers at most within their agency. In addition, because SLATT makes these trainings available for free to law enforcement, the interviews suggested that the costs to law enforcement agencies were fairly modest. So instead, through the web-based survey we conducted of SLATT training participants, we asked respondents to report basic information about the costs associated with their participation in the SLATT training they had attended (e.g., number of working hours spent away from normal duties to attend the workshop, how their position was covered, whether they received full or partial reimbursement for hotel and travel expenses, and an estimate of how much their department paid to send them to the SLATT training or workshop). These self-reported cost data are by no means as detailed or as accurate as an actual cost survey of an agency, but we felt that this was a reasonable initial step to understand the costs to law enforcement of these trainings.

## Organization of This Report

We organized the report as follows. Chapter Two presents a review of general threat trends for attacks against the homeland, of how law enforcement perceives these terrorism trends, and of the results of interviews with SLATT planners and participants who identified threat factors that motivated them to attend SLATT. Chapter Three presents the results of our analysis of the planning process. Chapter Four provides the results of a survey of SLATT training participants, including who attends these trainings, what their training goals are, what their assessment of the different components of SLATT training is, and what differences there are between participants in regular investigative/intelligence workshops versus train-the-trainer workshops. Chapter Five presents the results of a cost and benefit analysis and the choice experiment. Finally, Chapter Six discusses what was learned from the assessment and offers observations and suggestions for improving the SLATT Program.

Appendix A contains the questionnaire used in the RAND Survey of SLATT Workshop Participants, Appendix B provides a description of select SLATT Program features, and Appendix C provides the cost and benefit model statistics.

## 2. Terrorism Threat

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An initial question that arises in assessing BJA's SLATT Program is the continued utility of providing anti-terrorism training to state and local law enforcement. The need for such training was clearly recognized when SLATT was first developed in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing of 1996 and following the coordinated terrorist attacks of 9/11. However, it has been 15 years since 9/11, and thus it is worth reviewing terrorist threat trends to consider law enforcement's present-day needs for SLATT training.<sup>10</sup>

The purpose of this chapter is to consider such trends. First, we review general threat trends for attacks against the homeland. This review focuses on both the jihadi threat from Muslim extremism<sup>11</sup> and the threat from domestic terrorists, individuals who draw inspiration from U.S.-based extremist ideologies and movements.<sup>12</sup> Second, we review how law enforcement perceives these terrorism trends summarizing the results of a 2014 survey by Kurzman and Schanzer of state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies. We also draw on interviews we conducted with SLATT planners and participants who identified threat factors that motivated them to attend SLATT trainings.

### General Terrorism Trends

#### *Jihadi Terrorism*

*Jihadi terrorism* refers to terrorist acts and plots that are perpetrated by Muslim actors and have their roots in Islamic extremist ideology. Since 9/11 and for most of the past 14 years, al-Qa'ida was the primary terrorist threat to the United States. While CT operations have placed al-Qa'ida's core leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan under some pressure, it has been able to draw on its network of affiliates to expand its international reach. To this end, affiliate al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has proven the most capable threat to the United States. The

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<sup>10</sup> This assessment was conducted between September 30, 2012, and September 29, 2015; data collection ended in June 2015. Thus, our analysis predates the December 2, 2015, mass shooting and attempted bombing at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California, which killed 14 people and seriously injured 22 individuals. The perpetrators, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, were considered by the FBI to be homegrown violent extremists inspired by foreign terrorist groups. Our analysis also predates the June 12, 2016, mass shooting by Omar Mateen, a 29-year-old American security guard who killed 49 people and wounded 53 others inside Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida. This incident was the deadliest mass shooting by a single gunman and the deadliest incident of violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people in U.S. history, as well as the deadliest terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11. It was also widely considered a hate crime.

<sup>11</sup> Our use of the term *jihadi threat* elsewhere in this report refers to the threat from Muslim extremism.

<sup>12</sup> This definition of domestic terrorists is derived from Bjelopera (2013). It is derived from a number of different U.S. government sources that are discussed in this report.

group most recently helped plan the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris (Sengupta, 2015). It also planned several high-profile, but unsuccessful, attacks against the United States, including the attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to detonate an explosive device aboard a Northwest Airlines flight on December 25, 2009, and an attempt to send explosive-laden packages to the United States in 2010.

The group has also led al-Qa'ida's propaganda efforts, with the exhortations of American-born Anwar al-Awlaki and the jihadist magazine *Inspire*. Overall, while al-Qa'ida was unable to successfully launch an attack inside the United States, it did successfully inspire adherents to launch several high-profile attacks, including the 2009 attack at Fort Hood, Texas, and 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.<sup>13</sup>

Today, however, the Islamic State (IS) represents the most serious threat from jihadi terrorism. Since its June 2014 declaration of a caliphate, and drawing on an unheralded campaign of violence, IS has successfully exploited the chaos in Syria to develop safe havens in both Syria and Iraq. It has recruited affiliate organizations in Libya, Egypt, Algeria, and elsewhere. IS has also successfully exploited social media, including Twitter, to build its support base and recruit foreign fighters. To date, estimates suggest that IS has recruited over 27,000 foreign fighters, 6,000 of whom are Westerners. Approximately 330 North Americans are estimated to have traveled to Syria to join the IS cause (Kirk, 2016).

The main goal of much of this propaganda is to help IS build and expand on its territorial gains in Syria and Iraq. However, IS represents a threat to the United States in two primary ways. First, there is increasing concern that radicalized foreign fighters, armed with battlefield experience, will return to their home states and launch attacks (Byman and Shapiro, 2014). Second, IS has either planned or inspired a number of attacks against the West. In June 2016, 29-year-old Afghan American Omar Mir Seddique Mateen, who pledged allegiance to IS, opened fire on a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida, killing 49 people and wounding 53 (New America Foundation, "2016 Orlando Night Club Shooting," no date), and in December 2015, married couple Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik opened fire on a holiday party in San Bernardino,

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<sup>13</sup> Many commentators argue that the threat from al-Qa'ida and its affiliates has diminished. For example, Bergen et al. (2014) note the lack of successfully planned attacks in the United States since 9/11. The organization has not directly conducted any additional attacks in the United States or conducted any attacks "in the West since the bombings on London's transportation system in 2005." They note that, while the group's ideology has inspired adherents to kill 21 people in the United States, "a mass-casualty terrorist attack . . . on the scale of 9/11 is quite unlikely." The 2014 *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review* similarly argues that CT operations have degraded "the ability of al-Qa'ida's senior leadership to launch sophisticated external attacks" (DHS, 2014). DHS caveats this assessment noting that senior al-Qa'ida leadership continues to aspire to conduct such attacks and that its AQAP affiliate is of "greatest concern" because of its "interest in advancing plots to attack the United States, particularly against the aviation industry." The director of the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), Nicholas J. Rasmussen, took a similar view in his February 2015 testimony before Congress. While citing a "diminished" core al-Qa'ida leadership, he also said that AQAP remains "committed" to attacks against the West (Rasmussen, 2015). Alternatively, Seth G. Jones of the RAND Corporation observes in a 2014 report that the United States "faces a serious and growing Salafi-jihadist challenge overseas." For this conclusion, he notes that, between 2010 and 2013, there has been an "increase in the number of Salafi-jihadist groups, fighters, and attacks over the past several years" (Jones, 2014). At the time of this analysis, the forebears of the Islamic State (IS) were still affiliated with al-Qa'ida.

California, killing 14 individuals and wounding 24 (New America Foundation, “2015 San Bernardino Shooting,” no date). Tashfeen Malik pledged allegiance to IS on Facebook just prior to the attack. There have also been highly lethal attacks in Western Europe, including the attack in Nice, Paris, that killed 84 (Yuhas et al., 2016); a Paris shooting spree in November 2015 that killed 130 individuals; and a March 2016 bombing at the Brussels airport that killed 32 (Yourish et al., 2016). In a number of other cases, IS supporters were arrested for plotting attacks and planned travel to Syria (Yourish, Watkins, and Giratikanon, 2015).


### *Jihadi Threat Trends*

Beyond anecdotal attack data, another way of gauging the overall threat from jihadi terrorism is to consider trend data. Figure 2.1 depicts the number of jihadi extremists who were either indicted or convicted on terrorism-related offenses or who were highly suspected of such offenses but were killed before they could be indicted.<sup>14</sup> Figure 2.2 depicts the number of individuals killed by jihadi extremism in the United States. Overall, 357 jihadis in the United States have been indicted on terrorism charges or killed while committing a terrorist attack. Furthermore, attacks from jihadi terrorism in the United States have killed 94 individuals in the United States. While the number of those indicted/killed have waxed and waned between 2001 and 2016, the data show a clear and significant uptick in jihadi activity since 2014. These attacks can largely be attributed to the rise of IS and its inspiration for U.S. extremists.

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
<sup>14</sup> The New America Foundation has compiled a series of data about terrorism cases in the United States since 9/11. As part of this data series, the foundation has compiled both numbers of “American citizens and residents indicted or convicted for terrorism crimes who were inspired by or associated with al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups as well as those citizens and residents who were killed before they could be indicted but have been widely reported to have worked with or been inspired by al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups.” The data set excludes members of such groups as Hamas and Hezbollah. The data set also includes information about “individuals inspired by right wing, left wing, and other non-Jihadist political ideologies, who have been indicted for terrorism related crimes.” The website further notes that the “data on non-Jihadist extremists is less developed than the data on Jihadist extremists but where available it is included to provide a comparison across ideologies” (New America Foundation, “Methodology,” no date).

**Figure 2.1. Number of Jihadi Extremists Indicted or Killed, by Year, in the United States**



SOURCE: New America Foundation, “Homegrown Extremism 2001–2016,” no date.

**Figure 2.2. Number of People Killed in the United States by Jihadi Terrorism**



SOURCE: New America Foundation, “Deadly Attacks Since 9/11,” no date.

### ***Domestic Terrorism***

For the purposes of this report, we draw our definition for *domestic terrorism* from Jerome Bjelopera’s 2013 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report. According to the report, domestic terrorists are “people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based extremist ideologies and movements” (p. 6).<sup>15</sup> These ideologies include

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<sup>15</sup> This definition differs slightly from U.S. Code (18 U.S.C. § 2331), which defines *domestic terrorism* as terrorist attacks that “occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” This definition is neutral on the type of terrorist actor, be it right-wing extremist or Islamic. Drawing on the CRS definition better allows us to make this distinction.

extremist views associated with neo-Nazi, white supremacist, anti-government, black separatist, anti-abortion, neofascism, and animal rights and environmental movements. One factor complicating descriptions of domestic terrorism is that many of the actors who commit domestic terrorist acts draw on ideologies whose nonviolent expression are protected by the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment. While a number of groups may have extremist ideologies and while criminal or terrorist acts may draw on such ideologies, these groups are not considered terrorist organizations per se.<sup>16</sup>

Right-wing terrorism draws on a variety of different extremist ideologies, including white supremacist and anti-government ideologies. As the name implies, white supremacists believe in the superiority of the white race over others, with a particular animus held out for African Americans and Jews. Both neo-Nazism and skinheads fall into the white supremacy category. The attack at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church in Charleston, South Carolina, that killed nine was allegedly inspired by white supremacist views, though it is unclear whether the attack will be labeled terrorist (Reilly, 2015). In addition, a man with ties to the white supremacist movement killed three people at a Kansas City Jewish Center on April 13, 2014 (New America Foundation, "2014 Kansas Jewish Center Shooting," no date).

Both unauthorized militias and members of the sovereign citizen movement are considered anti-government extremists. Militias are citizen-formed paramilitary groups whose goal is to protect against what they perceive as an invasive government. Many militias fear that the government will confiscate firearms, and some hold anti-Semitic and racist ideologies (Bjelopera, 2013). In contrast, members of the sovereign citizen movement, according to the FBI, believe that they are separate or "sovereign" from the United States and so do not have to answer to "any government authority, including courts, taxing entities, motor vehicle departments, or law enforcement" (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010).

The most famous attack by anti-government radicals was the attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City in 1995 that killed 168 and wounded more than 680 others. Other recent attacks include the following:

- On November 22, 2014, anti-government activist Curtis Wade Holley killed a police officer and wounded a fireman who responded to a 911 call at his home (Schweit, 2016).
- On June 8, 2014, a married couple with anti-government and Nazi views allegedly ambushed and killed two police officers in Las Vegas (Schweit, 2016).
- A shooter with anti-government leanings killed one police officer and wounded another in an attack on the Blooming Grove police barracks on September 12, 2014 (New America Foundation, "2014 Las Vegas Police Ambush," no date).
- On November 27, 2015, an assailant with a semi-automatic rifle attacked a Planned Parenthood clinic in Colorado Springs, Colorado, killing three and wounding nine (New America Foundation, "2015 Colorado Planned Parenthood Shooting," no date).

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
<sup>16</sup> However, several private research institutions have kept such lists (Bjelopera, 2013), some of which we drew on for this analysis.

Finally, there are animal rights and environmental extremists, both of which commit criminal acts in support of their causes. Typically, animal rights and environmental rights extremists do not direct violence at humans, but instead commit crimes such as vandalism, theft, destruction of property, and arson. Both are supported by two movements, the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front, though crimes are generally executed by small or independent cells (Bjelopera, 2013).

### *Domestic Terrorism Threat Trends*


Figure 2.3 presents the number of domestic extremists indicted or killed by year, and Figure 2.4 presents the number of individuals killed by domestic extremism by year. Since 9/11, 48 individuals were killed by domestic terrorists. In addition, 182 domestic extremists were indicted, convicted, or killed—approximately 50 percent fewer than jihadi terrorists. Looking at recent trends, it seems there has been a sharp reduction in the number of domestic terrorists indicted or killed, with five or fewer since 2013. However, in both 2014 and 2015, the United States experienced some of the highest death rates from domestic non-jihadi terrorist attacks since 9/11, with eight and 12 individuals killed, respectively.

**Figure 2.3. Number of Domestic Extremists Indicted or Killed, by Year**



SOURCE: New America Foundation, "Homegrown Extremism 2001–2016," no date.

**Figure 2.4. Number of People Killed in the United States by Domestic Terrorism**



SOURCE: New America Foundation, “Deadly Attacks Since 9/11,” no date.

### *Investigative Methods Used to Detect Terrorists*

Finally, we briefly discuss U.S. capabilities to detect and thwart terrorist activity in the United States. Considering only jihadi extremism, according to data from the New America Foundation, there were 359 individuals who were indicted, convicted of, or killed in the commission of terrorist offenses in the United States since 9/11 (New America Foundation, “Homegrown Extremism, 2001–2016,” no date). Plans for terrorist activity were thwarted for all but 28 (7.8 percent) of these suspects. In addition, for 104 (29.1 percent), the investigative method was unclear, and 39 (10.9 percent) were identified through National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, or FBI intelligence channels. The remaining 171 (47.6 percent of cases) were identified through more typical police investigation channels, specifically:

- 53 (14.8 percent) community or family tips
- 52 (14.6 percent) informants
- 27 (7.6 percent) routine law enforcement
- 28 (7.8 percent) militants self-disclosed by publicizing actions
- 26 (7.3 percent) suspicious activity report (SAR).

### **Perceptions of Law Enforcement About the Terrorist Threat and Their Need for Training**

Next, we seek to characterize the terrorism threat as perceived by law enforcement. The goal is to understand how the primary audience for SLATT trainings (i.e., state and local law enforcement personnel) views the terrorist threat.

## *Survey of Law Enforcement*

In 2014, Charles Kurzman and David Schanzer surveyed state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies with more than 200 sworn officers to obtain their views about the violent extremism threat.<sup>17</sup> This survey predated the rise of IS, but the findings do provide several insights about how law enforcement views the terrorist threat.<sup>18</sup> First, Kurzman and Schanzer asked representatives of law enforcement agencies to identify the main violent extremist threats that their agency faces. The top three reported were anti-government violent extremism (73.8 percent of respondents), al-Qa'ida-inspired violent extremism<sup>19</sup> (39 percent), and environmental violent extremism (33 percent). The authors also asked respondents to rate the level of terrorism threat both at a national level and within their local jurisdiction. These findings are presented in Figure 2.5. As the figure indicates, agency representatives attributed a much higher threat level to terrorism at the national level (as indicated by the broken lines) than to local jurisdictions (unbroken lines). They also perceived that domestic violent extremists posed a greater threat than al-Qa'ida-inspired groups. The authors conclude that law enforcement representatives do not view terrorism as a severe local threat. Furthermore, they viewed al-Qa'ida-inspired terrorism as less of a threat than other forms of terrorism.


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<sup>17</sup> The sampling frame was all 480 state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies with more than 200 sworn officers. They also surveyed an additional 63 county and municipal agencies with 200 or fewer sworn officers in selected jurisdictions that experienced an incident or prosecution for violent extremism in recent years. Responses included 399 of the larger agencies (71 percent response rate) and 43 smaller agencies (68 percent response rate). Responses were received from 35 state agencies, 141 county agencies, and 206 municipal agencies whose jurisdiction combined cover 86 percent of the U.S. population (Kurzman and Schanzer, 2015).

<sup>18</sup> In reviewing this study, the specific position of the individual respondent for each agency remains unclear. Research findings may be different depending on whether this representative was an agency chief, a detective assigned to the intelligence unit, or a JTTF representative.

<sup>19</sup> The survey defined AQ-inspired violent extremism as “violent extremism inspired by the radical Islamist ideas advocated by al-Qaeda and other like-minded extremist groups.”

**Figure 2.5. Law Enforcement's Perception of National and Local Terrorism Threat**



SOURCE: Kurzman and Schanzer, 2015.

NOTE: VE = violent extremism.

### *Goals of SLATT Workshop Participants and Planners*

As detailed in Chapter Four, RAND's Survey of SLATT Workshop Participants found that 80 percent reported one of their training goals as being to improve their understanding of domestic and local terrorist threats and 67 percent reported a training goal of improving their understanding of international terrorist threats. To further understand the threats and training needs as perceived by law enforcement, we made site visits to SLATT training events and conversed with workshop participants and SLATT event planners to gather insights about the threat-related factors that motivated individuals to attend and/or host SLATT events.<sup>20</sup> It should be noted that individuals attended the SLATT events for a large variety of reasons. This is reflected in our survey results reported in Chapter Four, where workshop participants also reported such goals as enhancing their CT investigative skills, learning about how to investigate financial criminal activity, and meeting other law enforcement professionals working in this area.

Here, we summarize what interviewees told us were important factors in their decision to participate in the SLATT workshops. One of the themes heard from the interviews was an interest in *learning more about threats to their jurisdiction or region and how to investigate different types of threats*. For instance, workshop participants at the June 10–11, 2014, Hot Springs, Arkansas, advanced investigative/intelligence SLATT workshop cited a number of suspicious activities and pertinent investigations as reasons for attending. This workshop focused specifically on such topics as money laundering, terrorism financing, alternative remittance

<sup>20</sup> Interviews with event participants took place either during the event itself or in follow-on meetings after the conference. Attempts were made to use a semistructured interview format, but mid-conference conversations tended to be brief and less formal. Interviews with event planners were conducted under more formal circumstances (usually post-conference phone interviews or office visits) and routinely used a semistructured interview protocol. Overall, we interviewed 10 planners and 33 participants.

systems, and impostor detection and fraudulent ID training. Several interviewees identified ongoing financial investigations as a reason for their attendance. Another individual noted that he has been investigating tobacco smuggling in a Little Rock ethnic enclave that may have a terror nexus. His interest in attending the workshop was to “figure out how to follow the money.” Several interviewees commented on recent suspicious activities. One participant noted that there were several terrorism-like incidents in and around their local community, including a “right-wing individual who had amassed significant weapons and explosives.” A Hot Springs law enforcement officer recounted that a pipe bomb was laid on the doorstep of their police department, noting, “We had numerous events, ties to this area. There are sovereign citizens in [the] area. A lot of things on domestic level that would be very interesting [from a terrorism perspective].” In addition, a university law enforcement officer observed that he attended the workshop because a stolen university check was cashed for \$1 million in goods, most of which were shipped overseas. Some of these goods included military-grade helicopter helmets. He also noted that there were sovereign citizen groups in his local area.

Those who attended the November 5–7, 2014, Countryside, Illinois, SLATT investigative/intelligence workshop near Chicago thought about terrorism risk from the perspective of *protecting critical infrastructure*. One law enforcement officer charged with helping to protect Midway Airport commented that this installation is considered the “busiest square mile” in aviation. He advocated that more of Midway’s officers attend SLATT in the future, stating, “It’s particularly important to prevent incidents from occurring at airports because they tend to be highly impactful, affect the domestic and international economies, and are widely covered by the media.” In contrast, a law enforcement officer from Skokie, Illinois, observed that their biggest concern was the Illinois Holocaust Museum. Skokie is also the home to Chicago’s Reclamation Water Center, several hospitals, and two high-volume shopping malls. Law enforcement officers from Rosemont, Illinois, another Chicago suburb, noted that, while they have a small community with only 5,000 or so residents, the city’s many entertainment venues and attractions include a sports arena, multiple movie theaters, an expo center, and hotels that can swell the population above 1 million. Finally, an officer charged with protecting a major university campus spoke at length about the challenges of campus security. He noted that the downtown campus has a vast, multi-ethnic, and diverse population with a high concentration of international students. The school also houses a biosafety lab. Reflecting on the value of anti-terrorism training, he noted that intelligence analysts, patrol officers, and security guards would all benefit from SLATT training because they run 24-hour operations, are constantly interacting with students and faculty, must identify risks and problems, and must know when they are being surveilled.

Planners for the January 14–16, 2015, St. Louis, Missouri, SLATT event, in contrast, noted a mix of factors that prompted them to host this investigative/intelligence workshop. They noted that St. Louis has a number of high-profile targets, including such Fortune 500 companies as the

Boeing Company,<sup>21</sup> Monsanto Company,<sup>22</sup> and Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals. In addition, the city has two major universities: Washington University and Saint Louis University. They also expressed concern about black separatist movements in the surrounding area. They further noted that the city has the largest Somali diaspora population in the United States (outside of Minneapolis), and the largest Palestinian population.

Lastly, individuals who attended the train-the-trainer workshops held in Mobile, Alabama (August 6–7, 2014), and Franklin, Massachusetts (August 26–27, 2014), indicated that they had done so because they were interested in *incorporating the SLATT workshop lessons into their own departmental training courses*. A SLATT instructor at the Franklin workshop asked for a show of hands of participants with formal training responsibilities, and over half of participants raised their hands. Furthermore, nearly all of the individuals interviewed at these two workshops reported that they have formal training responsibilities within their law enforcement departments and that they attended in order to craft new, or improve on existing, training courses and seminars.

## Discussion

IS has, at least for the moment, overtaken al-Qa’ida as the most significant jihadi terrorism threat to the United States. Though al-Qa’ida, especially its affiliate AQAP, has continued attack planning against the United States, its efforts so far have not proven successful. In contrast, IS’s battlefield successes and viral propaganda campaign have helped it garner new affiliates, a worldwide support base, and a stream of foreign fighters. These foreign fighters may pose a future risk to the United States, while the immediate threat lies in its radicalized support base and a recent rise of terrorist activity in the United States. Indeed, in 2015 the number of individuals arrested or charged (or killed in the course of) for jihadi offenses increased dramatically. The fatalities from just the attacks in San Bernardino and Orlando more than doubled the total number killed from 2002 through 2014 combined (26 vs. 68). Domestic terrorist attacks have proven deadly in their own right. In fact, prior to the very recent upsurge in IS activity, domestic attacks killed 38 percent more people than attacks perpetrated by jihadis (271 vs. 180).

Federal, state, and local police play a significant role in limiting the potential risks of terrorism. Specifically, good policing, including the successful sharing of community and family tips, accounts for over half of those indicted/killed for jihadi-related terrorism offenses (New America Foundation, “Homegrown Extremism, 2001–2016,” no date). This, combined with other forms of intelligence, helps limit the terrorism death toll. While the FBI has played a

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<sup>21</sup> Boeing Defense, Space & Security’s headquarters is in St. Louis and represents one of the largest manufacturers in the state (Boeing, 2016).

<sup>22</sup> Monsanto Company, an agricultural company, has its world headquarters based in St. Louis, Missouri.

prominent role in much of these investigations, it seems prudent to continue training programs geared to local and state law enforcement.

It seems clear given the recent rise of IS and its ability to inspire attacks in the United States and Europe that there remains a critical need to maintain some type of anti-terrorism training for law enforcement. Local and state law enforcement seem to appreciate strategic concerns regarding jihadi and domestic terrorism threats to the United States, but express greater concern for domestic extremist groups, particularly anti-government and criminal sovereign citizen elements, who seem to disproportionately target law enforcement authorities (Kurzman and Schanzer, 2015). That said, local law enforcement takes a judicious approach to considering terrorism threats to their local jurisdictions. Though opinions may have changed given the rise of IS, law enforcement specifically assesses the local threat from both jihadi and domestic terrorism to be moderate rather than severe (Kurzman and Schanzer, 2015). Indeed, such attacks have dispersed throughout much of the country, thus mitigating the individual risk to any single locality. This lessened concern, however, has not reduced local law enforcement interest in anti-terrorism training.

### 3. Planning Process for SLATT Workshops

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#### Introduction

In Chapter One, we provided a brief overview of the planning process for SLATT workshops. Here, we describe it in more detail, based on interviews we conducted with IIR staff and those law enforcement or judiciary representatives at the state, regional, or local level involved in planning these events. Our goal was to understand how requests for a SLATT training are initiated; the planning process, including what factors determine what topics and curriculum will be provided; and factors that facilitate or hinder planning and participation. We also offer some observations about the planning process to inform our suggestions in Chapter Six about how it might be improved.

#### Methods

To understand the planning process, we conducted interviews with 11 planners of seven SLATT trainings (two specialized workshops conducted in 2013, three investigative/intelligence workshops conducted in 2014–2015, and two train-the-trainer workshops conducted in 2014).<sup>23</sup> When possible, the interviews were conducted in person at a specific training or by telephone following the training event. To guide our discussions, we used a semistructured interview protocol that covered the following topics: (a) what aspects of planning the individual was involved in or had responsibility for, (b) other stakeholders involved in the planning process, (c) how the focus of the workshop was determined, (d) how the training was marketed to law enforcement, (e) what resources were made available at the local or regional level to provide a venue and other logistical support for the workshop, (f) what factors facilitated or hindered planning, and (g) assessment of whether the SLATT workshop met expectations.

We also conducted interviews with IIR staff who attended the workshops, and we conducted several interviews with the vice president of IIR and the IIR director of the SLATT Program to get their perspective on the planning process. Similarly, we used a semistructured interview protocol to guide these discussions that addressed (a) goals of SLATT workshops, (b) how SLATT training has evolved over time, (c) what type of trainings USAOs and law enforcement

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<sup>23</sup> The SLATT workshops were: specialized workshop, Scottsbluff, Nebraska (August 7–8, 2013); specialized workshop, Columbia, South Carolina (September 3–4, 2013); advanced investigative/intelligence workshop, Hot Springs, Arkansas (June 10–11, 2014); train-the-trainer workshop, Franklin, Massachusetts (August 26–27, 2014); train-the-trainer workshop, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania (October 1–2, 2014); investigative/intelligence workshop, Countryside, Illinois (November 5–7, 2014); and investigative/intelligence workshop, St. Louis, Missouri (January 14–16, 2015).

most commonly request, (d) how is the target audience determined, and (e) the planning process for the workshop.

## The Planning Process

As noted in Chapter One, BJA manages the SLATT Program with IIR serving as the technical service provider for the SLATT Program, with USAOs, law enforcement, and other justice organizations initiating requests for training. These agencies also serve as hosts for SLATT training events and assist with planning, marketing, and handling the logistics for training.

Requests for SLATT training can come from a variety of sources. Requests can be initiated by the USAOs<sup>24</sup> or by law enforcement or justice organizations in a locality or region, and training opportunities might be identified by IIR staff. Typically a USAO<sup>25</sup> or law enforcement agency or association initiates a request for training. If initiated by law enforcement or an association, it will be requested that the agency also contact the USAO in the region to help sponsor the training. This is not always the case. In the instance of the Scottsbluff, Nebraska, specialized workshop, for example, a DHS representative took the lead in initiating and planning the workshop for this locality.

The focus of the training is determined by local needs in concert with discussions with IIR staff who manage the SLATT Program. For example, the Hot Springs, Arkansas, workshop had a strong focus on terror finance investigations. The Arkansas USAO was investigating possible financial crimes by local foreign nationals who were sending large bulks of cash overseas. When the USAO representative contacted SLATT Program staff, they indicated an interest in having local authorities gain a broader understanding of terror threats and specifically, identified the goal of helping state and local law enforcement understand issues pertaining to financial crimes, the possible nexus such crimes have to terrorism, and how local law enforcement can help the USAO “connect the dots” across investigations. Understanding the roles and responsibilities of the JTTFs and gaining key contact points were also an objective of this training event. In the case of the Columbia, South Carolina, specialized workshop, the law enforcement coordinator for the USAO sought feedback on the training needs for their state from the state’s law enforcement

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<sup>24</sup> The President appoints a U.S. Attorney to each of the 94 federal districts. The U.S. Attorney is the chief federal law enforcement officer in the district and, as such, has a vested interest in local training events that can increase anti-terrorism awareness. Every USAO also has an Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC), which has strategic information-sharing partnerships with JTTFs and similar law enforcement entities (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the United States Attorneys, 2015). From 2010 through 2012, USAOs from 47 states hosted or cohosted 146 SLATT events (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2012).

<sup>25</sup> The USAO’s level of involvement in the planning process may vary from site to site. For example, in Countryside, Illinois, the USAO served more as a macro-level coordinator. The office interfaced, as needed, with the Cook County Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (DHS-EM) but played a minor role in the planning and execution of the three-day training. For a number of other SLATT trainings (including those at Hot Springs, Arkansas; St. Louis, Missouri; and Columbus, South Carolina), representatives of the USAO played a central planning role.

coordinating committee (LECC), an eight-member drug subcommittee (that included law enforcement personnel), and partner organizations co-sponsoring the training (e.g., the South Carolina Law Enforcement Officer Association [SCLEOA]). In addition, the law enforcement coordinator reported also taking into account DOJ's priorities, with the goal of aligning the training with those priorities.

Requests for SLATT training may also come as a result of participation in previous SLATT workshops or hearing about previous workshops from colleagues. For example, in the case of Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, a representative from the USAO received an email from a counterpart in another city who described a recent SLATT train-the-trainer workshop that had been well received. The Pennsylvania USAO representative then contacted the local RISS center, and together they reached out to the SLATT Program to initiate a request for training. In the case of the Franklin, Massachusetts, training, the RISS representatives were primarily the planners for this workshop. For Countryside, Illinois, the local law enforcement liaison for Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region 5 indicated that he had been impressed with a Wisconsin SLATT training event he had seen previously and thought that Chicago would be good fit for a SLATT workshop because of its size and designation as FEMA's Regional Response Coordination Center. The FEMA liaison reached out to the Cook County Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (DHS-EM), which contacted the SLATT Program to request bringing a workshop to the Chicago area.

The SLATT Program receives more requests for training than it can fulfill; an IIR official noted that it is not uncommon to have a backlog of 120 requests for SLATT training. The SLATT Program typically holds one or more events per week. Given the degree of interest and the backlog of training requests, IIR must make determinations about where it can send speakers and where it can host SLATT workshops. Several factors are taken into consideration. First, while the SLATT Program receives requests for workshops from federal law enforcement or even private industry, priority is given to requests from USAOs and from state and local law enforcement. Second, one goal is to maximize the program's reach by prioritizing events that can raise a sufficiently large group of attendees. A general target of 100 or so participants is set for a workshop, but exceptions to this rule will also be made (e.g., for rural areas). Third, SLATT tries to ensure that training opportunities are spread geographically. SLATT Program staff, for example, will look at the requests and consider geographic areas they have not reached in recent years. Some locations that have previously hosted SLATT trainings may be asked to wait. For example, three highly attended SLATT workshops were held in Mississippi over the past several years. As one IIR interviewee noted, "They asked if we could do one again this fall; however, we just can't justify it. We have limited funds and we can't send another one this year, but [we say] 'let's talk about it next spring.'" The IIR interviewee noted that, to mitigate the backlog of requests, at times they also may encourage different requesters to work together. An exception is illustrated by the following comment by a senior IIR interviewee: "We also will prioritize trainings if there appears to be an urgent need somewhere such as the U.S. Department of Justice

may be particularly interested in certain cities, such as Minneapolis, Los Angeles, or New York City.” This interviewee further noted that, more recently, in considering how to balance the number of requests it receives, the SLATT Program is considering how to prioritize trainings based on operational necessity, with input from the FBI.

To develop the curriculum and determine the focus of the workshop, IIR discusses with the event hosts what their training priorities are and will encourage them to review the SLATT website to assist in identifying workshop or training topics important to cover. As part of that process, IIR will also discuss with them their local problems and will have researched as well what issues may be relevant to that locality. IIR will tailor the training to meet the goals of the event planners and suggest topics relevant to their locality. Interviews with select event planners and IIR staff confirmed the key role played by local event planners in determining a SLATT training event’s focus and content and the process by which the focus of the training and the curriculum are developed. Per a senior IIR interviewee, “Police chiefs understand the local issues and will inform us accordingly. They often want a one-day training on sovereign citizens, which has a set curriculum, but in most other situations we normally tailor the training to the needs of a specific locality or region.”

The goal of train-the-trainer workshops is somewhat different: to provide law enforcement personnel who are responsible for training with the tools to build a course and briefings for their agency. The workshops are also designed to provide them with the basics about terrorist threats, with information about how to deal with terrorism-related information they may learn on the street, and how to leverage the information on the SLATT website (as well as other websites such as that of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and FBI) to build their own briefings and courses. As a senior IIR interviewee noted, “We show them how to build a curriculum. We can’t make them terrorism experts, but we can show them how to build a course and bring people in like the JTTFs.”

The logistics of putting on a SLATT workshop can be summarized as follows:

- The SLATT Program handles the registration and prepares a workshop flyer for dissemination that announces the training and the date, describes the course, and contains a link to the SLATT website for registration purposes.
- The SLATT Program provides the workshop training materials (e.g., handouts).
- The SLATT Program is also responsible for the travel and related costs of its instructors.
- The event planners are responsible for
  - marketing the training (often using their email lists to distribute the flyer) to law enforcement and other judicial stakeholders in their region
  - broadly disseminating information about the training and encouraging participation
  - identifying and securing a venue that can hold at least 100 attendees
  - handling the conference logistics (e.g., meeting space, food, audio-visual equipment)
  - costs associated with the venue, marketing, and conference logistics
  - arranging for continuing education credits for the SLATT training if applicable.

## *Marketing the SLATT Workshops*

The SLATT Program handles the registration and prepares a workshop flyer that announces the training and the date, provides a description of who should attend,<sup>26</sup> explains that the training is sponsored by BJA, and lists who the event hosts are, the training location, the workshop schedule, a list of course topics, and, if relevant, whether continuing education credits are available. The flyer also contains a link to the SLATT website for registration purposes.

As will be discussed further in Chapters Four and Five, although SLATT does not charge a registration fee for participants to attend the workshop, there are some modest direct costs to law enforcement and other training participants. In general, travel, lodging, and daily expenses are the responsibility of the workshop participants.

The event planners are responsible for marketing the training and broadly disseminating information (e.g., via their own email lists) about the training and encouraging participation. Across the board, interviewees commented that the SLATT Program was well regarded and had a strong reputation, which simplified marketing efforts. Planners used preexisting email distribution lists to inform law enforcement and other relevant stakeholders about the trainings. The Countryside, Illinois, planners described their process in detail: The DHS-EM uses two methods to inform Chicago-area municipalities about training opportunities such as SLATT. Daily they electronically disseminate a publicly available situation report to approximately 10,000 recipients that includes training announcements. The DHS-EM also pushes out “situational awareness updates,” throughout the day, which may also include updates about training opportunities. Individual emails are also sent to senior law enforcement personnel, such as commanders, lieutenants, and training coordinators. The DHS-EM training coordinator also sends notices to both senior and junior law enforcement officers—“to anyone who has their finger on the pulse of the community.”

In Chapter Four, we present the results of a survey of workshop participants that summarizes the characteristics of attendees at five SLATT workshops. Planner interviewees commented that, in general, either participants are selected to attend the SLATT workshops by senior law enforcement supervisors or individuals self-select into attending the workshops. They also noted that a law enforcement agency may opt to send more-junior officers to the training to support their professional growth.

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<sup>26</sup> For example, several workshop flyers indicated the following as to who should attend: “State, local, and tribal law enforcement officers responsible for investigating and/or monitoring terrorist and criminal extremist groups or individuals will want to attend this workshop. Participants should possess basic investigative skills or have previous experience in the collection and analysis of criminal information.”

### *Planners' Views Regarding Factors That Facilitate or Hinder Planning and Participation in SLATT Workshops*

The planners we interviewed identified several factors that facilitated or hindered planning and participation in a SLATT training. The USAO representative for the St. Louis, Missouri, workshop, for example, identified three key factors that helped ensure high participation rates in their SLATT event: (1) the strong reputation of the SLATT Program meant that workshop participants knew that they would receive quality training, (2) SLATT does not charge registration fees, and (3) SLATT training helps to fulfill training or recertification requirements. The USAO planners for the Hot Springs, Arkansas, workshop similarly listed facilitating factors as including (1) the low cost to law enforcement agencies to send personnel, (2) the ability to fulfill training and certification requirements, and (3) the networking opportunities afforded law enforcement and other criminal justice stakeholders. The USAO planner for the Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, workshop also commented that the strong relationship between the police chief and the USAO anti-terror coordinator in his area helped facilitate participation. In terms of hindrances, the Hot Springs planners noted that the SLATT Program's requirement for a certain number of attendees can hinder the planning process.

Overall, the planners we interviewed had a favorable impression of the SLATT workshops and training. They cited the quality of the training and of the instructors:

We have other options such as specialists from FBI, FBI headquarters, the ROCIC [Regional Organized Crime Information Center]. [But SLATT] has the speakers, the background, the network and they know the topic.

[With SLATT,] I always know I will get the right speakers, professionally delivered. Professional instructors who are experienced at what they teach. They are the subject-matter experts.

What I like about SLATT, besides professionalism, their instructors are "boots on the ground" guys, been there and done that, and that resonates with the crowd. They stay cutting-edge. I just heard a detective say, "We are hearing things we didn't know."

The planners also commented about the content of the training:

I think the content was well focused and the follow-up areas [SLATT website and other websites highlighted during the training] with access to training and reference materials—that gives people some place to go.

I recall several participants going up to the instructors right after a presentation and relaying issues they have seen: "What you gave me was enlightening. How can I take the information I know to the next step?"

Also, several interviewees noted that the train-the-trainer workshops could benefit from more time spent on teaching participants on how to develop a course or briefing:

I think it would be good to have, maybe an hour or two [on training the trainer]. I have spent some time learning to train. These days, I know things I watch for and critique when I watch someone's training. A number of training techniques could

be covered in an hour or two that would help people at the local level. The audience for that are largely senior street cops or maybe a corporal or a lieutenant who will have responsibility to train his department. If he has not done a lot of public speaking before, you are giving him good content. But I think he could use some help in making the presentation appealing and meaningful for folks in his department.

The interviewees also expressed concern about the SLATT Program being canceled:

If they get rid of SLATT, it would be a slap in the face. Training is morphing. We are seeing more cyberterrorism. In the DOJ, the number one priority is and has been terror. For them to take SLATT away would be deemphasizing the priority that DOJ has in the first place. You have to align your training with your number one priority.

If DOJ ever got rid of SLATT, it would really hinder the ATAC training program; instructors are vetted, we know they are good. If I was to teach a course and I wanted CLE [continuing legal education credits], I would have to get designated, but their instructors are already designated. They are approved by DOJ and the Bureau of Justice Assistance. If you remove SLATT, it is a huge resource we lose for our terror training.

One of main reasons we get SLATT is the [SLATT Program] is funded so the training is free; we don't have to pay. That is what we have to do today is seek out free training.

## Discussion

There appears to be a demand for SLATT training, with more requests for SLATT briefings and workshops than the program is currently able to fill. According to a SLATT Program staff member, it is not uncommon for there to be a backlog of 120 requests for SLATT training. Requests can come from a variety of entities, with the program giving priority to requests from USAOs and from state and local law enforcement. In addition, the SLATT Program seeks to maximize its reach by prioritizing events that can raise a sufficiently large group of attendees, with a general target of 100 participants, and tries to ensure that training opportunities are spread geographically. More recently, BJA has encouraged IIR to take a more strategic approach to prioritizing requests, and IIR is considering taking into account operational necessity. How operational necessity will be defined raises the question about what is the right balance: (1) having SLATT training needs driven from the bottom up, with localities and regions determining what their terrorism-related training needs are and what topics would be particularly germane to state and local law enforcement, or (2) having SLATT training driven from the top down, where in consultation with the FBI, what type of training is needed is determined based on the threat and which jurisdictions to prioritize for the SLATT trainings.

To develop the curriculum and determine the focus of the workshop, IIR staff who serve as the technical service provider for the SLATT Program discuss with the event hosts what their training priorities are and will encourage them to review the SLATT website to assist in

identifying workshop or training topics important to cover. IIR tailors the training to meet the goals of the event planners, as well as suggest topics relevant to their locality. In the majority of SLATT workshops we attended, it was common for a representative from the USAO, the JTTF, and/or FBI to brief the audience on local threats and/or to participate in an informal panel discussion at the end of the training day. Ideally, this would provide an opportunity for attendees to receive an update on any local terrorism investigations or other relevant local, state, or federal anti-terrorism initiatives. Although the SLATT Program encourages representatives from the USAO and these other federal entities' participation in the workshops, there appeared to be some variation across SLATT events as to how these representatives did so (e.g., formal presentations or part of an informal panel discussion) and the extent to which they were effective in engaging workshop participants in a discussion of local issues.

Overall, the planners we interviewed had a favorable impression of the SLATT workshops and training. They cited the quality of the training and of the instructors and rated the content of the courses as being high. They also noted that the lack of a registration fee for SLATT trainings was an important factor facilitating participation by law enforcement and was important in helping them to ensure that state and local law enforcement in their region received training on terrorism. Other factors facilitating planning and participation in SLATT workshops cited by the planners included the positive reputation of the SLATT Program, the ability to fulfill training and certification requirements, and the networking opportunities afforded for law enforcement and other criminal justice stakeholders in the region. Several planners of train-the-trainer workshops recommended that some workshop time be devoted to training techniques and teaching participants on how to develop a course or briefing. In terms of hindrances, one commented on the requirement for a certain size of attendees (e.g., the general target of 100). Three of the interviewees also expressed concern that DOJ might cancel the SLATT Program, noting that doing so would signal less priority being placed on terrorism preparedness and training and would represent a loss of an important resource for state and local law enforcement to receive training in this area.

## 4. Participants' Assessment of SLATT Workshops

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### Introduction

We focused our assessment on the investigative/intelligence and train-the-trainer workshops conducted by SLATT, for several reasons. These workshops are intended to cover a range of topics to train law enforcement within a given region and typically reach 50 or more personnel per training. The fact that these workshops are more than one day in length enables IIR to cover a range of topics, whereas the other trainings offered by the SLATT Program tend to be one-day specialized workshops that address specific topics. In addition, the train-the-trainer workshops are intended to provide law enforcement trainers the information and resources that will enable them to develop courses and other trainings for their particular agency. Thus, from our perspective, these two types of workshops are core to the training that SLATT offers law enforcement.

To obtain the perspective of individuals who had participated in these two types of workshops, we conducted a survey of participants of five SLATT workshops conducted in 2014 and early 2015. We were interested in the participants' goals for the training, their assessment of the content of the training and its different components, what actions (if any) they had taken based on what was learned, their use of the SLATT website, and the costs associated with attending a SLATT workshop. Below, we present the survey results, first focusing on SLATT workshop participants' assessment of the training itself. Chapter Five presents our analysis of the costs and benefits to SLATT participants.

### Survey Methods

In the first year of the project, we attended several SLATT workshops to observe them and to conduct interviews with training participants.<sup>27</sup> The interview topics included questions related to participants' backgrounds, goals for the training, costs involved in attending the training, and plans for using the material learned. In addition, we learned about the planning process from two regional planners and IIR staff, as well as obtained the perspective of two SLATT instructors. During the first half of 2014, we also attended an investigative/intelligence workshop and an advanced investigative/intelligence workshop where we similarly observed the trainings and conducted interviews with participants and planners.<sup>28</sup> Combined, what we learned from these

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<sup>27</sup> In the base year, we attended two two-day specialized workshops and interviewed a total of 23 individuals (including 14 law enforcement workshop participants, two regional planners, two county prosecutors, one FBI representative, and four instructors and IIR staff).

<sup>28</sup> At these two workshops, we conducted interviews with 17 participants, one instructor, and one planner.

trainings provided us with the background information and insights about these workshops that was used to inform the development of the survey questionnaire.

The RAND Survey of SLATT Workshop Participants (see Appendix A) was designed to capture feedback from workshop training participants on (1) their background characteristics, (2) their goals for the training and how they learned about the training, (3) their assessment of the content of the training and its different components, (4) what actions (if any) they had taken based on what was learned, (5) their utilization of the SLATT website, and (6) costs associated with attending the SLATT workshop. We also wanted to compare the responses of those who participated in the train-the-trainer workshops with those who participated in the investigative/intelligence workshops. In addition, we included in the survey a choice experiment<sup>29</sup> that asked SLATT training participants to trade off and value different aspects of the training. The choice experiment and its analytic results are presented in detail in the next chapter.

Ideally, we would have obtained a list of all training participants in 2014 and early 2015 who attended the various SLATT workshops and trainings and surveyed all participants. However, IIR guarantees that workshop attendees' information will not be shared, and IIR was concerned that providing RAND a list of attendees' information would violate that promise. In consultation with NIJ and BJA, we agreed instead to have RAND staff attend the workshops that we planned to include in the survey and, at the beginning of each workshop, a RAND researcher briefed workshop attendees about the project providing an overview of the study and the goals of the survey. We then passed out a one-page study information sheet requesting that those individuals who would be willing to be surveyed write down their name and email address. For the five workshops we attended and planned to include in the survey, the majority of trainees agreed to be surveyed. Table 4.1 summarizes the type and location of the trainings, dates of the trainings, and the number and percentage of individuals per workshop who opted into the survey. Overall, 72 percent of the workshop trainees opted into the survey.

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<sup>29</sup> A discrete choice experiment is a technique for quantifying the perceived benefits in terms of willingness to pay. The choice experiment used here is intended to gather information about the value that officers placed on different parts of the training program (distance traveled, length of course, focus of the workshop, and whether registration costs were charged). See Chapter Five for more detail.

**Table 4.1. SLATT Trainings and Workshops Included in the Survey**

Type of Training	Location	Dates	Number of Attendees	Number of Opt-Ins	% of Trainees Who Opted into the Survey
Train-the-trainer workshop	Mobile, AL	Aug. 6–7, 2014	60	50	83
Train-the-trainer workshop	Franklin, MA	Aug. 26–27, 2014	58	38	65.5
Train-the-trainer workshop	Camp Hill, PA	Oct. 1–2, 2014	36	35	97
Investigative/intelligence workshop	Countryside, IL	Nov. 5–7, 2014	75	46	61
Investigative/intelligence workshop	St. Louis, MO	Jan. 14–16, 2015	87	57	65.5
			Total: 316	Total: 226	Average: 72

We fielded the web-based RAND Survey of SLATT Workshop Participants in two waves:

- Wave I (December 9, 2014–January 22, 2015)
- Wave II (February 22, 2015–April 10, 2015).

Wave I included participants who opted into the survey from the first four workshops listed in Table 4.1. Wave II included the last workshop conducted in January 2015. The fielding dates were chosen to allow for the individual participant to have adequate time following the training (at least one month after the workshop) to have utilized the information or taken specific actions that we wished to gather data about. For Wave I, we received 89 completed surveys, for a response rate of  $89/169 = 53$  percent. For Wave II, 57 individuals had opted into the survey and we received 27 completed surveys, for a response rate of  $27/57 = 47$  percent. The overall response rate for the survey was 51 percent (116 completes out of 226 invites).<sup>30</sup>

We conducted descriptive analyses of the survey results.<sup>31, 32</sup> We present the results overall and then stratified by type of workshop participant (investigative/intelligence versus train-the-trainer). Altogether, we surveyed participants from five SLATT workshops conducted in the

<sup>30</sup> A total of 126 individuals completed most of the items in the survey. For each question, we indicate what the denominator is for the responses reported.

<sup>31</sup> Descriptive statistics are used to provide simple summaries about the sample and the measures. Together with simple graphical analysis, they form the basis of most quantitative analysis of data (Research Methods Knowledge Base, 2006).

<sup>32</sup> The methodology for the analysis of the costs and benefits of SLATT training to participants based on the choice experiment data from the survey is discussed in Chapter Five.

latter half of 2014 and early 2015.<sup>33</sup> Recall that, for this assessment, the time period for data collection encompassed 2014 and early 2015. Of the 43 SLATT trainings offered between March 2014 and January 2015, the majority were one-day specialized workshops. Only five were investigative/intelligence or advance investigative/intelligence workshops, and four were train-the-trainer workshops. We surveyed participants from three out of the four train-the-trainer workshops and from two out of the five investigative/intelligence workshops offered during this time period.<sup>34</sup>

## Survey Results

### *Characteristics of Survey Respondents*

Who participates in SLATT investigative/intelligence and train-the-trainer workshops? Table 4.2 indicates that 59 percent of survey respondents represented city and county jurisdictions. In addition, 25 percent of train-the-trainer participants reported representing state jurisdictions, compared with only 4 percent of investigative/intelligence workshop participants. Nearly 13 percent were federal representatives.

**Table 4.2. Type of Jurisdiction Training Participants Represented**

<b>Jurisdiction Category</b>	<b>Overall</b>	<b>Investigative/Intelligence</b>	<b>Train-the-Trainer</b>
City/county	58.87%	65.38%	54.41%
State	15.32%	3.85%	25.0%
Federal	12.9%	15.38%	10.29%
Military	3.23%	1.92%	4.41%
College campus	1.61%	1.92%	1.47%
Other	8.06%	11.54%	4.41%
Total (n)	124	52	68

<sup>33</sup> Between March 2014 and January 2015, there were five investigative/intelligence or advance investigative/intelligence SLATT workshops scheduled. We attended four of the five workshops and utilized what we learned from the first two workshops to inform the development of the survey and from two survey participants from two of the workshops. In addition, between March 2014 and January 2015, there were four train-the-trainer workshops offered. We attended three of the four workshops and obtained consent from participants to be surveyed. One of the factors that influenced whom we surveyed is that we wanted enough time to elapse (at least one month) from the training to allow time for participants to be able to have utilized the information learned or shared it in order to understand in the near term how they used the information from the trainings.

<sup>34</sup> The survey questionnaire was developed in the late spring of 2014. Which workshops we were able to attend and brief participants to request their permission to survey them was. 2014 was also the first time we were able to observe train-the-trainer workshops.

With respect to their current position, overall about 24 percent of training participants were detectives or investigators and 22 percent were supervisors (Table 4.3). Intelligence analysts also participated in these workshops (6.5 percent overall). These patterns held for both types of workshops. In addition, nearly 15 percent of train-the-trainer workshop participants indicated that their current position was as a trainer.

**Table 4.3. Current Position of Training Participants**

<b>Position</b>	<b>Overall</b>	<b>Investigative/Intelligence</b>	<b>Train-the-Trainer</b>
Police chief	2.44%	1.92%	2.94%
Intelligence analyst	6.5%	5.77%	5.88%
Patrolman/officer	11.38%	11.54%	11.76%
Detective/ Investigator	23.58%	26.92%	22.06%
Special agent	5.69%	7.69%	4.41%
Supervisor	21.95%	19.23%	22.06%
Trainer	8.94%	1.92%	14.71%
Unit commander	1.63%	3.85%	0%
U.S. military/ contractor	0.81%	0%	1.47%
Administrator	3.25%	3.85%	2.94%
Security manager/ coordinator	4.88%	7.69%	2.94%
Other	8.94%	9.62%	8.82%
Total (n)	123	52	68

Overall, 86 percent of training participants were law enforcement officers who had worked in law enforcement for eight years or more (Table 4.4). Train-the-trainer workshop participants tended to be more experienced law enforcement personnel than those who had participated in the investigative/intelligence workshops. Specifically, 94 percent of train-the-trainer workshop participants, compared with 75 percent of investigative/intelligence workshop participants, reported eight or more years of law enforcement experience.

**Table 4.4. Number of Years Training Participants Have Worked in Law Enforcement**


<b>Years of Experience</b>	<b>Overall</b>	<b>Investigative/Intelligence</b>	<b>Train-the-Trainer</b>
1-4	1.63%	3.85%	0%
4-8	12.20%	21.15%	5.88%
8-12	17.89%	7.69%	23.53%
12 or more	68.29%	67.31%	70.59%
Total (n)	123	52	68

To understand whether training participants had CT responsibilities within their agency, they were asked to agree or disagree (using a five-point Likert scale<sup>35</sup>) with the following statement: “Counter-terrorism or terrorism prevention is a major responsibility of my job.” Overall, 42 percent of training participants agreed and 25 percent strongly agreed with this statement, indicating that two-thirds (67 percent) of those participating in the SLATT trainings reported being directly engaged in CT (not shown).<sup>36</sup> Figure 4.1 shows how the responses compare for those who participated in the investigative/intelligence workshops versus those who participated in the train-the-trainer workshops. In both instances, the majority of individuals (69.23 percent of investigative/intelligence workshop participants and 67.65 percent of train-the-trainer workshop participants) indicated that CT was a majority responsibility of their job.

<sup>35</sup> Likert scale options were strongly disagreed, disagreed, neither agreed nor disagreed, agreed, and strongly agreed.

<sup>36</sup> 19.5 percent either disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement, and 13 percent neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement.

**Figure 4.1. Percentage of Training Participants for Whom Counterterrorism Is a Major Responsibility of Their Job**



### *Participation in Recent SLATT Trainings*

Over the past five years, the majority of training participants had participated in one or two SLATT trainings. Sixty-eight percent of participants indicated they had attended one SLATT training or workshop within the past five years (Table 4.5). In addition, 13.45 percent of investigative/intelligence workshop participants and 26.47 percent of training-the-trainer participants indicated that they had participated in at least two workshops during this time period. Seven percent of train-the-trainer workshop participants had participated in SLATT trainings five or more times during the past five years, suggesting that SLATT trainings were of particular interest to law enforcement personnel responsible for developing courses or training for their departments.

**Table 4.5. Number of SLATT Training Events or Workshops Participants Had Attended During the Past Five Years**

<b>Trainings Attended</b>	<b>Overall</b>	<b>Investigative/Intelligence</b>	<b>Train-the-Trainer</b>
1	68.29%	76.92%	60.29%
2	20.33%	13.46%	26.47%
3	5.69%	7.69%	4.41%
4	0.81%	0%	1.47%
5+	4.88%	1.92%	7.35%
Total (n)	123	52	68

For the most recent SLATT training or workshop they had attended, we asked the survey respondents how far away was the training or workshop from their place of employment. Overall, about 67 percent reported that the training or workshop was 50 miles or less from their job (Table 4.6). Train-the-trainer workshop participants reported traveling farther than investigative/intelligence workshop participants to attend SLATT trainings: 20.59 percent reported traveling 50 to 100 miles and 26.47 percent reported traveling 100 miles or more to attend the SLATT train-the trainer workshops.

**Table 4.6. How Far Away SLATT Training Was from Participants' Place of Employment**

<b>Distance from Place of Employment</b>	<b>Overall</b>	<b>Investigative/Intelligence</b>	<b>Train-the-Trainer</b>
Within 25 miles	45.53%	61.54%	33.82%
25- to 50-mile radius	21.95%	26.92%	19.12%
50- to 100-mile radius	13.82%	5.77%	20.59%
100 miles or more	18.70%	5.77%	26.47%
Total (n)	123	52	68

Figure 4.2 illustrates that participants learned about the SLATT training opportunity from a variety of sources. Overall, 29 percent of participants heard about the SLATT training opportunity from their supervisor, commander, captain, or chief, and 13 percent from their colleagues (not shown). For train-the-trainer participants, the SLATT website or newsletter was also a key way in which they learned about upcoming opportunities for 40 percent of them (compared with 12 percent of investigative/intelligence workshop participants). Also, 18 percent of train-the-trainer participants and 15 percent of investigative/intelligence workshop participants reported hearing about the SLATT training opportunity from the state JTTF or a regional JTTF.

**Figure 4.2. How Participants Learned About the SLATT Training or Workshop (%)**



How did you hear about the SLATT training event or workshop? (all that apply)  
 Graphs by Workshop Type

### *Participants' Assessment of the Most Recent SLATT Training They Had Attended*

We asked workshop participants to indicate what their training goals were for the most recent SLATT training they had attended. This was a multiple-choice question, and respondents were allowed to select multiple goals. Overall, 67 percent were interested in improving their understanding of international terrorist threats. Consistent with the interview results reported in Chapter Two, 80 percent indicated that they were interested in domestic/local terrorist threats (Table 4.7). Sixty-four percent were also interested in enhancing their CT investigative skills. Thirty-four percent also viewed the SLATT training or workshop as an opportunity to meet other law enforcement professionals working in this area. Those who participated in the investigative/intelligence workshops were somewhat more likely than the train-the-trainer workshop participants to be interested in learning about financial criminal activity.

**Table 4.7. Participants' Training Goals**


<b>Goal(s) (mark all that apply)</b>	<b>Overall</b>	<b>Investigative/Intelligence</b>	<b>Train-the-Trainer</b>
Educational credit	19.05%	21.15%	17.65%
Better position self for promotion	14.29%	15.38%	14.71%
Meet other law enforcement professionals	34.13%	30.77%	38.24%
Improve understanding of international terrorist threats	66.67%	71.15%	64.71%
Improve understanding of domestic/local terrorist threats	80.16%	84.62%	80.88%
Enhance CT investigative skills	64.29%	69.23%	63.24%
Enhance investigative skills, other than terrorism	39.68%	48.08%	33.82%
Learn about investigating financial criminal activity	27.78%	34.62%	23.53%
Other	2.38%	3.85%	1.47%
Total (n)	126	—	—

NOTE: Because this was a multiple-choice question, the *n* varied per response category.

We then asked training participants to indicate their level of agreement with statements regarding the utility of the information provided in the workshop they most recently attended and whether the training changed how they approach or investigate domestic or international terrorist threats.


Overall, 94 percent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that the information provided on *domestic terrorist threats* was useful (not shown), though the investigative/intelligence workshop participants were more likely to strongly agree (87 percent) with this statement than train-the-trainer workshop participants (55 percent) (Figure 4.3).

**Figure 4.3. Participants' Assessment of Usefulness of Domestic Terrorist Threat Information Provided**



Overall, 93 percent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that the information provided on *international terrorist threats* was useful (not shown). Sixty-two percent of the investigative/intelligence workshop participants and 55 percent of the train-the-trainer workshop participants strongly agreed with this statement (Figure 4.4).

**Figure 4.4. Participants' Assessment of Usefulness of International Terrorist Threat Information Provided**




Overall, about 35 percent of investigative/intelligence workshop participants agreed and about 56 percent strongly agreed with the statement that the information provided on financial crime was useful (Table 4.8). Only about 2 percent strongly disagreed with the statement that the financial crime information provided was useful. This question was not relevant to the train-the-trainer workshop participants.

**Table 4.8. Participants' Assessment of Usefulness of Financial Crime Information Provided**

Response	Investigative/Intelligence
Strongly agree	55.77%
Agree	34.62%
Neither agree nor disagree	7.69%
Disagree	0
Strongly disagree	1.92%
Total (n)	52

A higher hurdle is whether the training provided would lead participants to change their approach to or how they investigate terrorist threats. Overall, 65 percent of workshop participants felt that the information provided during the SLATT training would change their approach to and/or how they might investigate *domestic terrorist threats* (not shown). Also, nearly 20 percent (not shown) indicated that they neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement, and 8 percent either disagreed or strongly disagreed. When we compare responses by type of workshop, the investigative/intelligence workshop participants (69 percent) were more likely to agree or strongly agree with this statement than train-the-trainer workshop participants (59 percent) (Figure 4.5). Again, 15.38 percent of investigative intelligence workshop participants and nearly 28 percent of train-the-trainer workshop participants neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement, suggesting that although the workshop participants may rate the information provided as useful, it is not enough information or training to necessarily change their approach to or how they investigate domestic terrorist threats.


**Figure 4.5. Participants' Assessment of Whether Training Received Would Affect Their Approach to Domestic Terrorist Threats**



Changed how I approach and/or investigate domestic terrorist threats  
 Graphs by Workshop Type

We received similar responses to the questions about international terrorist threats. Overall, 60 percent of workshop participants felt that the information provided during the SLATT training would change their approach to and/or how they might investigate *international terrorist threats* (not shown). Still, 22 percent neither agreed nor disagreed, and 7 percent indicated they disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement (not shown). Investigative/intelligence workshop participants (67 percent) were more likely to agree or strongly agree with the statement that what they learned in the workshop would change their approach to and/or how they might investigate international terrorist threats than train-the-trainer workshop participants (52 percent) (Figure 4.6). Also, about 17 percent of the investigative intelligence workshop participants and nearly 28 percent of the train-the-trainer workshop participants neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement.

**Figure 4.6 Participants' Assessment of Whether Training Received Would Affect Their Approach to International Terrorist Threats**




Changed how I approach and/or investigate international terrorist threats  
 Graphs by Workshop Type

Workshop participants were also asked for their assessment of the networking opportunities the SLATT workshop or training afforded them. Overall, 89 percent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that the training provided them with opportunities to make new connections in

the law enforcement community working locally or regionally on terrorist threats (not shown). This was especially important for train-the-trainer workshop participants, 52 percent of whom strongly agreed with this statement (compared with 44 percent of investigative/intelligence workshop participants) (Figure 4.7).


**Figure 4.7. Participants' Assessment of Whether the SLATT Workshops Provided Opportunities to Network with the Law Enforcement Community**



Provided opportunities to make new connections in the law enforcement community.  
Graphs by Workshop Type

With respect to networking opportunities with other justice agencies and experts, overall 86 percent agreed or strongly agreed that the training allowed them to make connections with non-law enforcement entities working locally or regionally on terrorism (not shown). Train-the-trainer workshop participants were somewhat more likely to strongly agree (49 percent) with this statement than investigative/intelligence workshop participants (42 percent) (Figure 4.8).

**Figure 4.8. Participants' Assessment of Whether the SLATT Workshops Provided Opportunities to Network with Other Justice Agencies and Experts**



Enabled me to make new connections with other justice agencies and experts.  
 Graphs by Workshop Type

Given the high ratings of the networking opportunities afforded by the workshops, we asked respondents whether they had contacted other participants they had met during the event and whether they had contacted the SLATT lecturers following the training received. Overall, 45 percent indicated that they had contacted other training participants, and 23 percent had contacted the SLATT lecturers since the event they attended (Table 4.9). Train-the-trainer workshop participants were more likely than the investigative/intelligence workshop participants to contact other participants and SLATT lecturers.

**Table 4.9. Whether Participants Contacted Other Workshop Participants or SLATT Lecturers Following the Training Received**

	Overall	Investigative/Intelligence	Train-the-Trainer
Contact other training or workshop participants?			
Yes	44.63%	38.46%	50.75%
No	54.55%	59.62%	49.25%
Don't know	0.83%	1.92%	0%
Contact SLATT lecturers?			
Yes	23.14%	17.31%	28.36%
No	76.03%	80.77%	71.64%
Don't know	0.83%	1.92%	0%
Total (n)	121	52	67

Another action workshop participants could have taken was to share the information from the SLATT training, workshop, or website with law enforcement or other colleagues who were unable to attend the event. Overall, 80 percent of participants reported that they had spoken with colleagues who were unable to attend the training about what they had learned, 40 percent reported sharing the handouts from the workshop with colleagues, and 31 percent reported sharing specific content from the training (Table 4.9). For most of the categories listed in Table 4.10, the train-the-trainer workshop participants were more proactive than those from the investigative/intelligence workshops in sharing the information learned from the SLATT training.

**Table 4.10. Whether Participants Shared the Information from the SLATT Training, Workshop, or Website**

Method	Overall	Investigative/ Intelligence	Train-the-Trainer
Spoke with colleagues about what was learned from the SLATT event	80.16%	78.85%	85.29%
Shared the SLATT training/workshop handouts with colleagues	39.68%	44.23%	38.24%
Shared the SLATT website address with colleagues	23.81%	23.08%	26.47%
Shared specific content (e.g., briefings, SLATT newsletters) from the SLATT website with colleagues	30.95%	26.92%	36.76%
Gave a class or briefing to others in their agency or department	17.46%	13.46%	22.06%
Other	6.35%	3.85%	8.82%
Did not share the information learned	6.35%	11.54%	2.94%
Total (n)	126	—	—

NOTE: Because this was a multiple-choice question, the “n” varied per response category.

The SLATT website is intended to augment the information provided in the workshops. We asked survey respondents how often they had visited the SLATT website in the past three months and for those who had visited it at least once, for what purpose.

**Table 4.11. How Often Participants Visited the SLATT Website in the Past Three Months**

Number of Times Visited Website	Overall	Investigative/Intelligence	Train-the-Trainer
1–2	36.36%	51.92%	25.37%
3–4	31.40%	26.92%	35.82%
5–6	15.70%	9.62%	20.90%
7 or more	4.96%	0%	8.96%
0	11.57%	11.54%	8.96%
Total (n)	121	52	67

Overall, 68 percent had visited the SLATT website between one and four times in the past three months (Table 4.11). Train-the-trainer participants in general visited the website more frequently, with 21 percent (compared with 10 percent of investigative/intelligence workshop participants) reporting having visited five or six times in the past three months, and 9 percent reported having visited the website seven or more times. This finding is not surprising given that the SLATT instructors emphasize the content of the website as a resource in the train-the-trainer

workshops and that these workshops are aimed at those who train other law enforcement and will be developing briefing and courses in this area.

Participants' reasons for visiting the website included to review the *SLATT Bulletin* (60 percent), review the Virtual Library (41 percent), review online training material (36 percent), review SLATT publications (29 percent), and/or to register for a SLATT workshop or training (26 percent) (Table 4.12). In general, train-the-trainer workshop participants were more likely than investigative/intelligence workshop participants to use the website to access a range of training materials and to conduct research. For example, 73 percent of train-the-trainer participants reviewed the *SLATT Bulletin*, compared with only 48 percent of investigative/intelligence workshop participants; 59 percent reviewed the Virtual Library, compared with only 23 percent; and 43 percent searched the Terrorism Incidents Database, compared with only 15 percent.

**Table 4.12. Participants' Reasons for Visiting the SLATT Website**

<b>Reason</b>	<b>Overall</b>	<b>Investigative/Intelligence</b>	<b>Train-the-Trainer</b>
Register for SLATT event or workshop	26.19%	46.15%	13.24%
Review <i>SLATT Bulletin</i>	59.52%	48.08%	73.53%
Review Virtual Library	41.27%	23.08%	58.82%
Search Terrorism Incidents Database	29.37%	15.38%	42.65%
Review online training material	36.51%	30.77%	44.12%
Watch a video	16.67%	13.49%	20.59%
Review SLATT publications	29.37%	21.15%	38.24%
Contact SLATT expert	0.79%	1.92%	0%
Other	1.59%	1.92%	1.47%
Total (n)	126	—	—

NOTE: Because this was a multiple-choice question, the *n* varied per response category.

#### Train-the-Trainer Workshop Participants' Assessment

One of the goals of the train-the-trainer workshops is to prepare participants to teach the material and to develop their own briefings and courses. We asked whether participants felt that these workshops had sufficiently prepared them to teach other law enforcement personnel the material that was covered in the workshops. Overall, 86 percent of train-the-trainer workshop participants agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that “I feel sufficiently prepared after the SLATT Train-the-Trainer workshop to teach others the material that was covered in the workshop” (not shown).

Seventy-nine percent planned to use the material they learned in the SLATT train-the-trainer workshop to teach colleagues who were unable to attend the event (Table 4.13). Of those who were planning to do so, they were asked in what capacity did they plan to teach others. Fifty-nine percent planned to develop their own class, and 54 percent planned to share the materials they had received from the training or from the website with colleagues.

**Table 4.13. In What Capacity Train-the-Trainer Participants Planned to Teach Others**

	<b>Train-the-Trainer Participants</b>
Show others how to use the various resources from the SLATT training and/or website	39.71%
Share some of the materials from the SLATT training and/or website with colleagues	54.41%
Use the class materials and notes from the SLATT training and/or website to design own class	58.82%
Total (n)	68

NOTE: Because this was a multiple-choice question, the *n* varied per response category.

## Discussion

Overall, the SLATT training participants rated the workshops highly. For example, 87 percent of the investigative/intelligence workshop participants strongly agreed with the statement that the information provided on domestic terrorist threats was useful, and 62 percent of investigative/intelligence workshop participants strongly agreed that the information provided on international terrorist threats was useful. In terms of the train-the-trainer workshop participants, 55 percent strongly agreed that the information provided on domestic terrorist threats and on international terrorist threats were useful.

A higher hurdle is whether the training provided would lead participants to change their approach to or how they investigate terrorist threats. Overall, between 60 and 65 percent of workshop participants felt that the information provided during the SLATT training would change their approach to and/or how they might investigate *international terrorist* or *domestic terrorist* threats. However, 15 percent of investigative intelligence workshop participants and nearly 28 percent of train-the-trainer workshop participants neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement, suggesting that, although the workshop participants may rate the information provided on domestic terrorist threats as being useful, it was not sufficient to necessarily change their approach to or how they investigate domestic terrorist threats. A similar finding was seen for international terrorist threats: 17 percent of the investigative/intelligence workshop participants and nearly 28 percent of the train-the-trainer workshop participants neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement that the information provided would change their approach to and/or how they investigate international terrorist threats.

A majority of trainees reported that CT was a major responsibility of their position, suggesting that the investigative/intelligence and train-the-trainer workshops are attracting law enforcement officers who are actively engaged in this area. Those who participated in the investigative/intelligence workshops had similar training goals to those who participated in the train-the-trainer workshops: A majority were interested in improving their understanding of international and domestic terrorist threats; two-thirds were interested in enhancing their CT investigative skills; and a third viewed the SLATT training or workshop as an opportunity to meet other law enforcement professionals working in this area. Overall, they felt that the information provided on international and domestic terrorist threats was useful and that what they had learned they reported influenced their approach and/or investigation of these threats.

Train-the-trainer workshop participants differed in some important ways from trainees who attended the SLATT intelligence/investigative workshops. Train-the-trainer workshop participants tended to be more experienced law enforcement officers (with respect to the number of years they had been in law enforcement careers) and were more likely to travel farther to attend the SLATT workshops. They tended to be more measured in their assessment of the usefulness of the information provided in the workshops. They also were more likely to be proactive in networking with other participants and SLATT instructors, utilizing the SLATT website, and sharing the information they had learned. Train-the-trainer workshop participants also utilized the SLATT website more and utilized it for a range of training and research activities. In addition, nearly two-thirds planned to utilize the SLATT workshop and materials to design their own courses.

## 5. SLATT's Costs and Benefits to Participants

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### Introduction

The RAND Survey of SLATT Workshop Participants included a choice experiment that asked SLATT training participants to trade off and value the different aspects of the training they had received. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part consists of the survey that measures direct and indirect costs that law enforcement officers who participated in SLATT training faced, such as distance traveled and time spent to attend the SLATT Program, the out-of-pocket expenditures that they faced, and how their position was covered. The second part measures the benefits of the training as perceived by the participants. It consists of a discrete choice experiment, a technique for quantifying the perceived benefits in terms of willingness to pay. Training participants were given a set of six choice scenarios and asked to pick their preferred option in each. Given that price was included as an attribute in these choice sets, willingness to pay for the SLATT seminar can be indirectly estimated for changes in the combination of other attributes. This choice experiment gleans insight about the value that officers place on different parts of the training program, which can then be utilized to improve the overall participant experience.

It is perhaps useful to clarify what this study is not: It is not a cost-effectiveness or benefit-cost analysis of SLATT to the public or taxpayers.<sup>37</sup> Consistent with the previous chapter and the aim of this project, this chapter focuses on understanding the costs and benefits of SLATT to training participants.

### Analyzing Costs and Benefits to Training Participants

To improve law enforcement training programs, it is important to better understand the financial costs and benefits encountered by participants that attend these programs. Though it is certainly true that the typical officer does not pay any direct registration fees for attending a SLATT training, officers may face other costs, such as travel and accommodations and even effort costs from attending the workshop. By properly measuring and accounting for the benefits and costs of attendees into the workshop design, it is possible to adjust features of the program in the future to increase the net benefit of the program to officers. This could improve the overall training experience for officers and/or encourage more officers to attend the SLATT workshops, thus leading to more successful outcomes, such as more networking opportunities, more efficient use of officers' time, and greater satisfaction with the overall program.

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<sup>37</sup> The cost of SLATT to taxpayers is publicly available information. (See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, *FY 2016 Performance Budget*, 2015.)

There are a number of attributes of the SLATT Program that have already been developed to encourage officer participation, including offering courses for free and centrally locating training programs to accommodate underserved, rural areas. Two key questions remain, however: (1) How much time and money is spent by local and state police to attend a SLATT training? (2) How much do officers value key features of SLATT Programs? Knowing this would help decisionmakers design programs in the future that maximize the benefits and minimize burdens on officers and their departments, which could improve participation rates and hopefully lead to more-informed and more-connected police forces around the country. Against this background, RAND was tasked to quantitatively measure the direct and indirect costs incurred by participants of the SLATT Program and the perceived benefits.

In this chapter, we provide data on the stated out-of-pocket expenses incurred by SLATT participants, broken down by the type of session (investigative/intelligence workshop or train-the-trainer workshop) attended. We also provide numbers for the total distance traveled to attend the training program, the number of hours spent at the workshop, and how participants' work shift was covered while they were away attending SLATT training. To calculate these costs, our survey asked participants how much they spent on a range of items (food, travel, time, etc.). Since not all departments reimburse officers and some officers attend the training in their own time, a more complete picture of the cost of training was obtained by asking officers directly (rather than asking their departments, for example). Taking everything into account, it appears that some individuals undertake a financial burden in attending the training program—though, assuming that the preferences of officers can be revealed by their spending habits (revealed preference theory), most law enforcement officers surveyed found the program worthwhile, despite these expenses.

To understand how much value officers place on different attributes of the program, we conducted a stated preference experiment. In this approach, individuals were asked to make a series of choices between two training programs that differed slightly in their attributes. For example, one program might be farther away, whereas another program might be shorter. Through several rounds of such choices, it is possible to statistically infer the value that participants place on each attribute of the training program. This process of categorically severing the program into core components, and then estimating the value placed on each component, allows decisionmakers to make informed decisions about how to best structure future programs to provide the most value to officers.

Again, this study does not evaluate the costs and benefits of the SLATT course to taxpayers, and this is not an evaluation of SLATT relative to alternative trainings. This study uses standard approaches to quantify costs and benefits; we focus on the main training costs and benefits described by participants. The findings of this study are relevant only to SLATT training programs; they are not transferable to other training programs. However, the approach used in this study could be used to answer these questions for trainings more generally or another training program more specifically in the future.

## *Methods*

To identify the key features of the program to evaluate, we conducted a series of interviews with SLATT organizers and past participants at two workshops (one in the Midwest Region and one in the South Region of the United States). To ensure that interviewees did not miss any of the presentations, interviews were conducted during scheduled breaks. This limited the number of interviews on the costs and perceived benefits of the program to 14 interviewees with the following titles: intelligence analyst, JTTF agent, lieutenant, patrol officer, prosecutor, sergeant, sheriff, and training coordinator. Interviewees were selected by RAND and IIR based on participants' job title—we aimed to obtain a range of professions and roles. Interviewees with a relevant (different) job title were asked whether they were willing to participate and informed that all questions were related to their job and decision to participate in the program. We obtained a 100 percent response rate.

Interviewees were asked a series of open-ended questions regarding the direct cost to participants (e.g., fees and travel and accommodation expenses), indirect costs (e.g., opportunity costs, time spent away), and perceived benefits (e.g., meet other people, content of training). The responses to these open-ended questions helped inform the type of questions that we chose to ask in the SLATT survey, as well as the parameter values that were given for those options.

### **Costs of SLATT to Respondents**

The interviews revealed that not all participants attended training during working hours and that some participants were not reimbursed for expenses by their department. Therefore, we determined that the most appropriate methodology for obtaining information on the cost to participants was to survey participants directly. This would also allow us to provide the proportion reportedly fully reimbursed for direct costs and the amount of indirect costs (e.g., total time spent) that each person faced.

Based on these interviews, we included several items in the survey on direct and indirect costs to training participants regarding

- working hours spent away from normal duties
- how the respondent's position was covered
- estimates of how much the respondent's department or agency paid for travel, food, hotel, other
- whether participants were reimbursed.

Respondents were asked to provide the amount spent for food/drink, hotels, and travel (including fuel) because these were the cost items identified in interviews. There was no course fee for any of the training programs. While respondents could indicate the amount spent for an item, many respondents chose not to answer, and we assume that nonresponse to a line item (e.g., food/drink, hotel, travel) indicates a zero cost. We also allowed for an "Other Cost" option. For this option, several respondents indicated "vehicle depreciation" because they used a department vehicle. This may be important to note for police department planning, though we

did not attempt to calculate the vehicle depreciation costs. Another cost indicated was for tolls. Again, we did not include this cost in the total costs.

The SLATT trainings evaluated in this study were 2.5 working days for investigative/intelligence workshops and two working days for train-the-trainer workshops. However, some officers were on call and may have had to leave; some officers may have been able to do some work during the training times; and some trainings may have required lengthy travel time, which some interviewees indicated can be an important factor in choosing whether to participate in the training. So we asked participants to report the total number of working hours they were away from normal duties, including travel time.

While some departments may have the manpower to cover another officer for multiple days away for training, other departments may not. Alternatively, some officers may attend training on their own time or be on call, so there was no need for someone else to cover their shift. There can also be a budget issue if an officer is brought in to work overtime to cover the officer away at training. To account for these issues, one survey question asked respondents whether their shift was covered and, if so, whether the person covering their shift was working at salary pay or overtime pay. An “Other” option was provided to allow respondents to explain how their position was covered.

For the exact wording and response options, see the survey protocol in Appendix A.

#### Value of SLATT Features to Respondents

While the survey items provide information on the tangible costs reportedly incurred by participants, they do not tell us anything about the subjective value that the program has to participants. To quantify the subjective value of key attributes, we conducted a stated preference discrete choice experiment (SPDCE). The SPDCE enabled the elicitation of the willingness to pay for, or willingness to accept, these specific attributes of the SLATT Program. Data collection involved the same web-based survey completed by participants of both train-the-trainer and specialized training programs. Survey respondents were asked to compare and choose between pairs of scenarios.

Regarding course topics, the workshops provide numerous examples of local and international terrorism as a way to teach officers about terrorism, including domestic radicalization. Given the importance of such examples in the workshop, an attribute was added to the survey that varied the types of examples offered. The purpose of this attribute is not to measure the impact of domestic terrorism; rather, it is to examine officers’ preferences about materials taught in the class.

Concerning duration of training, interviewees indicated that the number of hours or days of a training course influences their decision and thus preferences for a course. Similarly, for distance from home base, officers indicated that this was a feature they factored into their decisionmaking process.

Lastly, although interviewees indicated that they were likely to be reimbursed for registration fees or their agency would directly pay registration fees, the cost of the course was an important aspect in deciding whether to attend. Interviewees described the costs of other trainings (e.g., \$100–\$800 depending on duration, content, etc.), suggesting familiarity with the level of registration fees, and even patrol officers indicated that deciding whether to put in a request to attend training is affected by the fee.

Each scenario had four attributes that were commonly mentioned during the interviews: course topics, duration of training, distance from home base, and registration cost. Each of these attributes had one of three (or four, in the case of one attribute) possible “levels”:

- Topics covered: domestic terrorism, domestic terrorism with local examples, or domestic terrorism with local examples and international examples
- Course length: 1 day, 2 days, 3 days, or 4 days
- Course location: within 25 miles, 25 miles to 100 miles, or 100+ miles (police department to pay for hotel and meals)
- Course registration fee: \$0, \$100, or \$200.

The attribute levels shown for each choice pair were purposefully selected based on principles of experimental design, so that the researcher could observe how respondents make trade-offs between attribute levels. Based on the choices that the participants make, it is possible to reconstruct the value that they place on each characteristic of the program. This is a strength of the SPDCE method, compared with methods of directly asking respondents to state their preferred workshop, which research shows would produce highly biased estimates for the value of each component (McFadden et al., 2005). Results are all presented in the same monetary unit (dollars) using the course registration fee attribute.

We designed the questions to ensure that no two scenarios were the same and that no set of scenarios was repeated for the same respondent. We performed a series of statistical tests to ensure that the attributes were uncorrelated. That is, we needed to ensure that particular attribute levels were not more likely to appear together. One does not want, for example, that, if “domestic terrorism with local examples” appears in an option, then “two days” almost always appears in the option as well. This would lead to statistically biased responses. Specifically, we used the Pearson correlation coefficient between the ranked variables (Spearman correlation coefficient) to test for correlation, and we fail to reject the hypothesis that there is no association between variables.

Methodologically, the SPDCE has the advantage of obliging respondents to make trade-offs between different attributes, and thus more closely reflects real-world situations in which the designers of training programs have to take into account multiple factors with limited resources. The scenarios represented “the non-ideal world” (in which attributes were low in one aspect but high in another), which forced respondents to make trade-offs based on the type and level of

attribute.<sup>38</sup> The SPDCE method has been used extensively in the fields of health and environmental and transport economics (Louviere, Flynn, and Carson, 2010), although applications in criminal justice policy are relatively limited (Heaton, 2010).

Figure 5.1 shows a screenshot of the choice questions in the survey. As shown, there are two options, each associated with a different content, course length, distance, and registration fee. The respondent must indicate which one is preferred. The respondent is shown six of these questions in total. Each question has different combination of levels for content, length, location, and fee. In responding to the questions, respondents use their personal views of how “bad” or costly they perceive fewer topics or courses that are far away, for example, to decide which future scenario they prefer. It is not possible to know exactly why people prefer certain features. For example, for the attribute of course distance, if participants prefer courses that are closer to them, it may be because there would be less time away from their families, because there would be less driving, and/or because they would be able to remain on call for their department.

**Figure 5.1. Screenshot of One Question in the Choice Experiment**

	Option A	Option B
Topics covered	domestic terrorism	domestic terrorism with local examples
Course length	1 day	2 days
Course location	25 miles to 100 miles	within 25 miles
Course registration fee	\$0	\$100

The analysis involved developing discrete choice (yes-or-no outcome) models developed from the data collected. We followed a standard procedure involving a number of statistical specification tests:

1. We developed an initial model that incorporates only the attribute levels of the experiments.

<sup>38</sup> Another commonly used stated preference method is contingent valuation (CV). CV studies elicit willingness to pay or willingness to allow through direct questioning, e.g., “What is the maximum amount you would be prepared to pay every year to reduce the risk of x?” (the “open-ended” format) or “Which of the amounts listed below best describes your willingness to pay every year to reduce the risk of x?” (the “payment-card” format). A main difference between CV and the SPDCE is that CV questions are typically unidimensional, whereas SPDCE exercises are multidimensional.

2. We tested alternative model specifications to include the type of training attended (train-the-trainer, specialized training) in order to test whether different groups of respondents placed different valuations on any of the attributes.
3. We tested alternative model specifications to test the functional representation of the attributes in order to determine whether categorical, linear, or piece-wise linear specifications were the most appropriate.
4. Once the final model was identified, we corrected for the interdependence of stated preference observations.<sup>39</sup> While a number of methods can be used to correct for the interdependence of stated preference observations, experience has shown that a good practical method is to use the “jackknife” procedure. It is a standard statistical method for testing and correcting misspecifications (Labbé et al., 1998).
5. We tested whether the model fit statistics of the final model. The model coefficients and their statistical significance are reported in Appendix C.

The choice study was conducted at the end of the SLATT survey and thus had slightly more attrition than the other survey. In total, 115 respondents completed all the questions in the choice study, whereas 116 respondents completed all the questions in the SLATT survey (for a full description of the sample, see Chapter Four). Conditional on starting the choice study, there was very little attrition: Most of the respondents completed all the questions, so results are based on a sample with characteristics shown in Chapter Four. In terms of attrition, 119 individuals responded to at least one question of the survey, 118 finished one of the six choice experiment questions, 117 finished two or three questions, 116 finished four or five questions, and 115 finished all six questions (97 percent of respondents completed all choice questions).

## Results

We first present survey findings for the direct costs (e.g., fee, hotel, accommodation) and indirect costs (e.g., time) of the training programs to participants and their departments for the investigative/intelligence and train-the-trainer participants separately. Within each group, we show the reported costs for those reporting they were fully reimbursed and the costs for those reporting they were not fully reimbursed or not reimbursed at all. We then present findings for respondents’ valuation of the attributes of the two types of training programs using the SPDCE approach.

### How Much Time and Money Were Spent to Attend the Training?

The results in Table 5.1 show that, for those indicating that they were fully reimbursed, expenses were reportedly \$12 and \$22 per person, on average, for the train-the-trainer and the investigative/intelligence workshops, respectively. For those indicating they were not fully reimbursed or not reimbursed at all, mean total amount spent was approximately \$86

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<sup>39</sup> An advantage of the SPDCE approach is that it allows for the collection of several responses from each individual, which substantially reduces the cost of data collection. However, the collection of multiple responses from the same individual means that a respondent’s basic, underlying preferences apply to the series of their responses. Thus, responses are not independent.

(investigative/intelligence) and \$168 (train the trainer). The greater costs for train-the-trainer workshops may have been driven by a greater proportion of people, 42 percent compared with 14 percent of the investigative/intelligence group, who traveled over 100 miles and therefore incurred food, travel, and accommodation expenses approximately two times those in the investigative/intelligence group.

All groups spent 19–23 working hours, or 2.5–3 working days, away from normal duties when taking into account traveling time. Approximately 10–30 percent had their shift covered by a colleague on regular pay. For the investigative/intelligence group, 50–57 percent did not have their shift covered. Using the “Other Costs” option, 13 percent of investigative/intelligence participants reportedly that fully reimbursed respondents were on call while attending the training. This is consistent with results that 60–64 percent of these participants traveled less than 25 miles to attend the meeting, so they could be available relatively quickly. For the train-the-trainer group, 62–84 percent did not have their shift covered. This may be due to participants attending in their own time (11 percent of the fully reimbursed group participating in the train-the-trainer workshop that indicate “Other Costs” attended in their own time); training is their main job, so they did not need to have their shift covered; they were on call; and/or they simply did not have their shift covered.

**Table 5.1. Results of Costs of SLATT Programs, Mean and Standard Deviation**

	Investigative/Intelligence		Train-the-Trainer	
	Fully Reimbursed (N = 38)	Not Fully Reimbursed (N = 14)	Fully Reimbursed (N = 37)	Not Fully Reimbursed (N = 31)
Out-of-pocket (direct) costs	\$21.71 (84.1)	\$85.71 (183.7)	\$12.73 (51.6)	\$168.18 (229.4)
Food/drink	\$1.31 (8.1)	\$21.43 (46.0)	\$0.75 (3.5)	\$46.90 (62.6)
Travel	\$6.18 (19.6)	\$20.70 (32.5)	\$1.13 (5.3)	\$45.08 (59.5)
Accommodation	\$0.00 (0.0)	\$43.57 (110.8)	\$0.00 (0.0)	\$76.03 (122.9)
Other	\$14.21 (81.2)	\$0.00 (0.0)	\$10.84 (51.5)	\$0.16 (0.9)
Time <sup>a</sup> (in hours)	23.4 (9.9)	19.9 (11.2)	18.7 (9.2)	21.0 (14.8)
How position covered				
Not covered	0.50	0.57	0.62	0.84
Colleague—regular pay	0.29	0.29	0.27	0.10
Colleague—overtime pay	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00
Other				
Day off/own time	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.03
On call	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.00
Do not know	0.08	0.07	0.00	0.03
Distance traveled				
Within 25 miles	0.60	0.64	0.35	0.32
25 to 50 miles	0.32	0.14	0.24	0.13
50 to 100 miles	0.05	0.07	0.27	0.13
100+ miles	0.03	0.14	0.13	0.42

NOTE: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> Spent away from normal duties, including travel time.

## Benefits of SLATT: How Much Did Officers Value Key Features of the Trainings?




We used a conditional logit model<sup>40</sup> to estimate the value that officers placed on each core component of the training program. The slope coefficients for each of the regression models that were run can be found in Appendix C. We used those coefficients to calculate the value that officers placed on each component of the program. For each attribute (length of conference, distance away, and topics covered), we compared the dislike that officers had for losing money (as measured by the average slope coefficient for the cost of the program) with the amount that they liked/disliked the other attributes (as measured by the slope of the coefficient for that specific attribute). The results, presented in Figure 5.2, show the valuation by respondents for three features of the program—number of training days, distance to training site, and content of the training—compared with a baseline of a one-day SLATT training program, less than 25 miles away, with domestic terrorism information only. Findings are presented in dollars for a registration fee, because respondents value the money.

For each attribute, the base level of the attribute is missing—so that attribute levels are compared relative to the base level. A positive number means that individuals liked the attribute relative to the base, and a negative number means that individuals disliked the attribute relative to the base. In column 1 of Figure 5.2, we analyze the results by pooling all individuals together. The findings can be interpreted as follows: A two-day, three-day, or four-day SLATT training course is preferred to a one-day SLATT training course. Overall, individuals would be willing to pay (or request for training funding of) \$97 to extend the training from one day to two days, \$175 to extend the training from one day to three days, and \$87 to extend the training from one day to four days. Thus, it appears that a three-day training is the most valued length, followed by a two-day training, a four-day training, and finally a one-day training.

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<sup>40</sup> Discrete choice models attempt to describe decisionmakers' preferences among alternatives. Logit is the most widely used and popular discrete choice model. It is based on random utility theory, which assumes that individuals choose the option that offers them the higher utility, where *utility* is defined based on the product characteristics as well as a random error term. Based on observed choices and the properties of the error term, it is possible to estimate predictions regarding the likelihood that a person chooses each item.

**Figure 5.2. Valuation of Three Key Attributes of the SLATT Training Workshops**

	ALL	Investigative	Train the Trainer
	1 day (base)	.	.
	2 days	+ \$97 ***	+ \$59 ***
	3 days	+ \$175 ***	+ \$132 ***
	4 days	+ \$87 ***	+ \$31
	<25 miles (base)	.	.
	25-100 miles	- \$20	- \$18
	100+ miles	- \$170 ***	- \$136 ***
	Domestic (base)	.	.
	... + local	+ \$36	+ \$5
	... + local + int'l.	+ \$175 ***	+ \$128 ***

NOTE: Asterisks indicate the level of statistical significance, where \*\* p-value < 0.05 and \*\*\* p-value < 0.01. No asterisk means not statistically significant.

The result that the “optimal” number of days for a SLATT training program is three days generally holds if we examine the investigative/intelligence group and the train-the-trainer group separately. There seem to be differences in the magnitude of this result across the two groups: For example, the investigative/intelligence group has higher valuations for the trainings overall than the train-the-trainer group. One reason the investigative/intelligence group might be willing to pay more for the trainings is because they find the program to be extremely valuable; another reason is that they are simply less price-sensitive, given that their office is more likely to cover the expense. A test to see whether the values are different across the train-the-trainer and investigative/intelligence groups found that these differences were not statistically significant. One interesting finding of our study is that the investigative/intelligence group significantly prefers two- and four-day courses more than single-day courses. The train-the-trainer group, on the other hand, does not seem to like four-day courses, although they do like the two- and three-day course options.

Regarding distance to the training program site, respondents are indifferent between a program that is less than 25 miles away and a program that is 25 to 100 miles away; i.e., they do not prefer one over the other. However, respondents do have an aversion for programs that are

more than 100 miles away. In fact, they would be willing to pay (or request from the department) \$170 more as a registration fee to go to a program that is nearby than to travel over 100 miles. In the survey, any additional expenses that might result from traveling distances beyond 100 miles was explicitly reimbursed by the department of the respondent, so this result is not due to concerns for the cost to themselves. This finding could still be out of concern for the department's training budget limitations or even just asking for reimbursement. It may also be due to traveling the distance (e.g., leaving early in the morning, driving late, driving in traffic) and/or the implication this distance has for being away from home and family.

The content of the program is perhaps where we observe the most-significant differences in perceived benefits of the investigative/intelligence and train-the-trainer groups. While both groups prefer a program with international topics over a program with only domestic topics, only the respondents from the investigative/intelligence workshops place value on local examples. They would be willing to pay \$106 to add local examples to a program of domestic topics, whereas participants of the train-the-trainer workshops are not particularly interested in local examples, i.e., they are indifferent between a program with local examples and a program without local examples.

An important feature of this type of analysis is the ability to compare features of the program. For example, suppose a SLATT training program is one day and has only domestic topics. Those residing over 100 miles away from the training incur a tangible and intangible loss valued at \$170 to attend the training program. The designers of the program could offset the loss felt by those having to travel from so far by increasing the number of days to two (and hold all else equal about the program). Or they could add international examples to the training program of domestic-only topics, and that would offset the loss for people having to travel from over 100 miles away.

Another important finding is how to design the optimal program. For the investigative/intelligence group, the preferred program lasts three-days, covers domestic and international topics and local examples, and is located within a 100-mile radius. For the train-the-trainer workshop, the preferred program lasts three days, covers domestic and international topics, and is located within a 100-mile radius.

## Discussion

Overall, we found that SLATT workshop participants place a high value on the training received. This analysis makes several contributions to practitioners working on the SLATT training programs specifically and the criminal justice literature more broadly. First, we showed that, while there was no registration fee charged by SLATT for the training, there were other, small costs to law enforcement to participate in the training. Perhaps more important than the out-of-pocket costs is that we find that 50 percent and 20 percent of respondents of the investigative/intelligence and trainer-the-trainer workshops reportedly paid out of their own

pocket, and they paid approximately \$85 to \$170. An implication of this finding is that some people expected the training to be very valuable. Furthermore, 50 percent to 60 percent of investigative/intelligence participants did not have their shift covered. We show that this may be because they attended the training on their own time, they were on call and did not need their shift covered, and/or their shift simply was not covered.

Second, through a survey-based experimental approach, we identified features of the SLATT workshops that participants value most and the optimal program design in terms of three key attributes. Results indicated that officers prefer a program that lasts three days, covers international and domestic topics, and is less than 100 miles away. Participants place great value on being close to home, so, if a policy goal is to maximize the number of people with access to the program, it would be important to map out 100-mile radii of past trainings and future trainings, and consider that individuals outside those areas are highly unlikely to attend the training. Respondents indicate that the negative impacts of a program over 100 miles away could be offset by a three-day program with international topics (compared with a one-day program with domestic topics only).

Third, this study found that there were potentially interesting differences between the two types of training participants. The investigative/intelligence group preferred a program with more content and a longer course, whereas the train-the-trainer group preferred specific content and not as long duration. Be that as it may, the value that the investigative/intelligence group placed on local examples was lower than the value they placed on international topics and other features, e.g., three-day program within 100 miles. Results show that the most important additional content feature that SLATT designers could provide is international topics.

Fourth, this study contributes to the small body of research examining police training and ways to improve participation rates. Previous research finds that there are several areas where police departments could improve in order to increase training and decrease their chances for being involved in litigation, including finding ways to reduce the cost of training, which would allow more officers to attend (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2010; Police Executive Research Forum, 2010; Smith, 1988); determine the training needs of the department; keep current and organized training documentation on each officer; and make sure that all policies and procedures are up to date (Parkinson, 2011). An implication of this study is that, in the context of SLATT, a training desired by SLATT participants is on international terrorism topics. Furthermore, long distance is an important determinant in whether police officers will attend a SLATT training. It is not clear what is driving this result—it could be time away from home and family and/or the inability to be on call implied by long distances to a training site.

Lastly, this analysis expands the use of SPDCE applications in the criminal justice field. SPDCE approaches have almost exclusively been used in the criminal justice field to calculate willingness to pay to reduce crime, but widely used to understand barriers to training for other fields. This is the first study we are aware of that uses the approach to assess the value of a police training program. We demonstrate that officers are willing and able to participate in such a

survey-based experiment, and that the approach was successful in generating the quantitative measurement of subjective beliefs, as requested.

## 6. Summary and Suggestions for Improving the SLATT Program

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In this chapter, we summarize our findings and observations and make suggestions for improving BJA's SLATT Program.

### Findings

#### *The Need for Continued Law Enforcement Training on the Terrorist Threat*

State and local law enforcement play an important role in detecting and preventing terrorist attacks. Strom et al. (2010) estimated that 80 percent of foiled terrorist plots in the United States were discovered because of observations by state and local law enforcement or by the general public. Discoveries of terror plots during routine law enforcement investigations of seemingly ordinary crimes and criminally suspicious activity constituted the fourth-largest source of initial clues (Strom, Hollywood, and Pope, 2016). In examining plots against American targets between 1987 and 2010, Dahl (2011) also concluded that plots were most often foiled through conventional law enforcement activities.

Fifteen years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, does terrorism-related training for law enforcement still need to be an important priority? Given the current and evolving threat picture, the answer, in our view, is clearly “yes.” While the United States has not suffered as catastrophic an attack those of 9/11, there appears to be no significant abatement of attempted attacks or attack planning in the past 15 years. Though AQAP attacks have so far proven unsuccessful in directing attacks against the United States, the recently successful strikes by IS-inspired extremists in Brussels, Paris, San Bernardino, Orlando, and Nice should give significant cause for concern. In addition to the present-day risk from IS-inspired extremists, there also remains the future risk of battle-hardened IS foreign fighters returning from Syria to the United States and Europe. Also of concern is the growth of the sovereign citizen movement, which specifically targets law enforcement.

Given the critical role that law enforcement plays in countering the terrorist threat, these trends suggest an ongoing need to ensure that state and local law enforcement receive training in this area. Although the FBI and other federal law enforcement are responsible for investigating terrorist threats, they rely on the information-sharing about terrorist threats and the detection and response by state and local law enforcement. State and local law enforcement play an important role in detecting and identifying possible terrorist threats at the regional and local levels and in building partnerships with local communities. Indeed, analysis has shown that, in detecting or thwarting terrorist attacks, good policing, along with community and family tips, accounted for over half of those indicted or killed for jihadi-related terrorism offenses (New America

Foundation, “Homegrown Extremism, 2001–2016,” no date). Any strategy for countering violent extremism (CVE) has to go beyond the JTTFs and will depend on strengthening local partnerships with communities and reducing barriers to sharing of information; law enforcement will be a key partner in this regard. In February 2015, the White House convened a three-day summit on CVE to discuss what steps the United States and its partners can take to develop community-oriented approaches to CVE from a range of groups and individuals, including domestic terrorists and homegrown violent extremists in the United States, as well as terrorist groups like al-Qa’ida and IS. Community engagement was seen as key, with local law enforcement being central to these efforts: “CVE efforts are best pursued at the local level, tailored to local dynamics, where local officials continue to build relationships within their communities through established community policing and community outreach mechanisms” (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2015).

### *Assessment of the Usefulness of SLATT Workshops*

As noted above, our survey focused on the investigative/intelligence and train-the-trainer workshops. A majority of participants who responded to the survey reported that CT was a major responsibility of their position, suggesting that SLATT is attracting law enforcement officers who are actively engaged in this area. Those who participated in the investigative/intelligence workshops had similar training goals to those who participated in the train-the-trainer workshops: that is, improving their understanding of international and domestic terrorist threats, enhancing their CT investigative skills, and meeting other law enforcement professionals working in this area.

Overall, the SLATT workshop participants reported that the information provided on the domestic and international terrorist threats was useful, with the investigative/intelligence workshop participants tending to rate higher the utility of this information than the train-the-trainer workshop participants did. A higher hurdle is whether the training provided would lead participants to change their approach to terrorist threats or how they would investigate them. Overall, six out of ten workshop participants indicated that the information provided during the SLATT workshops would change their approach to international or domestic terrorist threats and/or how they might investigate them. Still, 15 percent of investigative/intelligence workshop participants and nearly 28 percent of train-the-trainer workshop participants indicated that they neither agreed nor disagreed with this sentiment. It may be that the workshop confirmed the already good investigative tactics employed by these participants, or it could suggest that the content was not sufficient to lead to a change in their approach to these threats and/or how they might investigate them.

The SLATT workshops are between one-and-a-half and two days long and cover a range of topics. In our view, the value of the SLATT investigative/intelligence workshops is to increase awareness of the terrorism threat and provide training on how to detect and report possible terrorist activities identified during routine law enforcement duties. This involves introducing

and updating law enforcement on the different topics covered and facilitating networking among law enforcement and other experts in the region. Most of the participants who responded to the survey indicated that they had attended only one or two SLATT trainings in the past five years; this suggests that exposure to the information through SLATT is infrequent for most law enforcement personnel and supports the idea that a reasonable expectation of these trainings is that the workshops increase awareness of the terrorist threat and facilitate networking among law enforcement and judiciary personnel in a region versus having a substantive effect in changing how law enforcement investigates, for example, possible terrorism-related activities. Also, the SLATT training through the website points law enforcement to where they can learn more about a particular topic. All of this seems to suggest that more-specialized courses, such as those offered by FLETC, are where law enforcement officers working a specific CT mission (as part of a CT or homeland security unit or a specialized response team or who help staff a fusion center) will be able to get the specialized training needed to further develop their skills in this area. Having said that, for many law enforcement personnel, the SLATT investigative/intelligence workshops are of value for the reasons listed above.

The train-the-trainer workshops are fundamentally different from the investigative/intelligence ones. They are intended to provide instruction to law enforcement personnel responsible for training or developing courses for their agencies and provide information and resources to assist them in doing so. These one-and-a-half-day workshops thus have a different focus than the more general investigative/intelligence workshops. Train-the-trainer workshop participants tended to be more experienced law enforcement officers (with respect to the number of years they had been in law enforcement careers) and were more likely to have participated in more SLATT trainings (about 40 percent reported that they had participated in two or more SLATT trainings in the past five years, compared with 23 percent of participants in the investigative/intelligence workshops). Train-the-trainer workshop participants' survey responses suggested that they were primarily interested in the information, resources, and materials provided during the training that would help them to develop their own training; indeed, the workshop curricula are set up with this goal in mind. Train-the-trainer workshop participants also were more likely than investigative/intelligence workshop participants to be proactive in networking with other participants and in contacting SLATT instructors following the workshop, in using the SLATT website to access additional information and resources, and in sharing the information they had learned. Nearly two-thirds of train-the-trainer workshop participants indicated that they planned to use the information learned during the SLATT workshop and materials provided to design their own courses. They also were more likely to travel farther to attend a SLATT workshop. These findings suggest that the SLATT train-the-trainer workshops are reaching the appropriate audience.

As part of this assessment, we were interested in how much participants actually used the SLATT website. Overall, two-thirds of SLATT training participants had visited the SLATT website between one and four times within the past three months of the most recent event they

had attended. In general, train-the-trainer participants visited the SLATT website more frequently than investigative/intelligence workshop participants. Fifty-two percent of investigative/intelligence workshop participants visited the SLATT website one or two times within the past three months of the most recent training they had attended, whereas 21 percent of train-the-trainer participants reported having visited it five or six times in the past three months, and 9 percent reported having visited the website seven or more times. This is not surprising, given that the SLATT instructors emphasize the content of the website as a resource in the train-the-trainer workshops and given that the train-the-trainer participants are interested in training other law enforcement personnel, including creating their own classes on this topic.

Not only did train-the-trainer participants visit the SLATT website more frequently, but they also were more likely to use the website to access a range of training materials and to conduct research than investigative/intelligence workshop participants. For example, 73 percent of train-the-trainer participants reviewed the *SLATT Bulletin*, compared with only 48 percent of investigative intelligence workshop participants; 59 percent reviewed the Virtual Library, compared with only 23 percent; and 43 percent searched the Terrorism Incidents Database, compared with only 15 percent. This suggests that the SLATT website is viewed as an important resource, particularly by law enforcement involved in training other personnel on CT. Further, overall, 24 percent of SLATT training participants shared information about the website with their colleagues, and 31 percent shared specific content from the SLATT website with their colleagues.

### *Assessment of the Costs and Value of SLATT Workshops*

#### **Costs of SLATT Workshops**

What did we learn about the costs to law enforcement to participate in SLATT trainings? SLATT workshops are offered at no cost to law enforcement (i.e., the SLATT Program does not charge registration fees for law enforcement or other stakeholders to attend their trainings). The SLATT planners we interviewed commented that, while CT training, in general, must compete with other law enforcement agencies' priorities, SLATT helps ensure that this type of training is reaching state and local law enforcement by providing it at no cost to participants. The planners also commented that SLATT training further supported their overall preparedness goals for terrorism and supported other training they did in this area, noting that the no-cost aspect was very important to agencies' being able to have personnel participate in the SLATT trainings. Indeed, some planners expressed real concern that, if SLATT training was canceled or no longer funded by DOJ, it may affect their ability to train state and local law enforcement on terrorist threats and would send a message, in their view, that the federal government did not prioritize law enforcement training in this area.

However, SLATT trainings are not completely no cost to law enforcement. The law enforcement agencies and other justice entities that host the SLATT trainings do incur some

costs in terms of working with IIR to plan the event, market the training, and provide the venue and logistical support for these workshops.<sup>41</sup> In addition, the survey respondents reported some minor travel costs associated with attending the workshops. For example, for those participants who reported that they were fully reimbursed by their department, the reported expenses ranged from \$12 and \$22 per person, on average, for the train-the-trainer and investigative/intelligence workshop participants, respectively.<sup>42</sup> For those who reported that they were not fully reimbursed for their travel expenses by their department, the reported expenses ranged on average from \$86 (investigative/intelligence workshop participants) to \$168 (train-the-trainer workshop participants). The greater costs for train-the-trainer workshop participants may be partly because a greater proportion of these respondents—42 percent (compared with 14 percent of the investigative/intelligence workgroup participants)—indicated that they had traveled over 100 miles to attend the SLATT training and, therefore, incurred food, travel, and accommodation expenses about two times those of the investigative/intelligence workgroup.

Further, participants reported spending approximately 2.5 to 3 working days<sup>43</sup> (investigative/intelligence workshop) and approximately 2.3 to 2.6 days (train-the-trainer workshop) away from their normal law enforcement duties to attend the SLATT workshops. Thirty percent of participants in the investigative/intelligence workshops reported that their shift was covered by a colleague regularly paid (i.e., not overtime pay), while between 50 and 57 percent<sup>44</sup> reported that their shift was not covered at all. Between 10 and 27 percent<sup>45</sup> of the train-the-trainer workshop participants reported their shift was covered by a colleague regularly paid, while 62–84 percent<sup>46</sup> of the train-the-trainer workshop participants reported that their shift was not covered. While our survey allowed us to capture such direct costs, it did not allow us to

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<sup>41</sup> The costs to planners were not explored in our assessment; however, future analyses may want to quantify these costs.

<sup>42</sup> Because many agencies may send one or a few personnel to a SLATT training, we determined that it was infeasible to do a formal cost survey of these agencies to capture these costs; therefore, we depended on the self-reported information from workshop participants about travel expenses, reimbursement, and whether their positions were covered.

<sup>43</sup> Included travel time and time to participate in the workshops.

<sup>44</sup> For the investigative/intelligence workshop participants, 50 percent of those who reported being fully reimbursed and 57 percent of those reported being partially reimbursed for travel expenses by their department indicated that their shift was not covered.

<sup>45</sup> For the train-the-trainer workshop participants, 27 percent of those who reported being fully reimbursed and 10 percent of those reported being partially reimbursed for travel expenses by their department indicated that their shift was covered by a colleague regularly paid.

<sup>46</sup> For the train-the-trainer workshop participants, 62 percent of those who reported being fully reimbursed and 84 percent of those reported being partially reimbursed for travel expenses by their department indicated that their shift was not covered. This could be due to participants attending on their own time (11 percent of the fully reimbursed group indicated that they attended on their own time), training is their primary job so they did not need to have their shift covered, they were on call, and/or they simply did not have their shift covered.

capture information about the associated indirect costs, for example, in terms of other training forgone to attend the SLATT training.

### Features of SLATT Workshops and Value Placed by Participants

In addition to asking survey respondents about costs—travel costs incurred, whether their expenses were reimbursed, and whether their position was covered while they were attending the SLATT training—we also used a series of questions and a combination of different workshop attributes to ask them to trade off what features of the SLATT workshops were most important to them. Our analysis of this choice experiment was focused on what attributes of these workshops participants placed greater value on. For the choice experiment, we varied four attributes: distance traveled, registration costs if the hosting agencies requested it, focus on domestic or international terrorist threats, and length of the training. Simply put, the choice experiment provides information for IIR and for planners as to what factors help draw law enforcement or incentivize them to participate in SLATT workshops.

We found that, across the two types of workshop participants, a three-day training was most valued, followed by a two-day training, suggesting that the optimal number of days for a SLATT workshop is three days. This result generally held even when we examined the investigative/intelligence group and the train-the-trainer group separately.

In terms of the distance participants are willing to travel, investigative/intelligence and train-the-trainer workshop participants preferred to travel less than 100 miles away from home, suggesting that IIR and event planners can expect to draw law enforcement personnel within a 100-mile radius or less. In fact, overall, workshop participants would be willing to pay (or request for their department to pay) \$170 as a registration fee to attend a workshop that was nearby rather than to travel over 100 miles. Investigative/intelligence workshop participants valued more than the train-the-trainer workshop participants having the training within a 100-mile radius. Specifically, investigative/intelligence workshop participants would be willing to pay (or request their department to pay) \$252 as a registration fee to attend a workshop that was less than 100 miles away, whereas the train-the-trainer workshop participants would be willing to pay \$136 as a registration fee. Although investigative/intelligence workshop participants preferred a program with both domestic and international terrorist topics, they also valued more than train-the-trainer workshop participants having the training include local examples of the terrorist threat in their region or jurisdiction. Train-the-trainer workshop participants, in general, preferred workshops not as long in duration and more focused on specific content. They also valued learning about both international and domestic terrorist threats but placed less value on having local examples.

## Suggestions for Improving BJA's SLATT Program

As summarized in Chapter One, SLATT workshops encompass a range of different types of events that vary in their target audience, content, and length and in opportunities for SLATT experts to present at law enforcement and other conferences. Our suggestions pertain to two of the main types of trainings that IIR puts on and that we examined in this report: investigative/intelligence workshops and the train-the-trainer workshops.

In our view, BJA's SLATT Program serves an important function in law enforcement training by focusing on regions and bringing together law enforcement personnel and other experts within a region to focus on the terrorist threat and to network. The fact that SLATT training has been provided in every state underscores that IIR is trying to ensure broad coverage and not concentrating on just urban localities. This helps to ensure that CT training reaches both large urban departments or metropolitan areas and law enforcement more broadly within a region, thus providing such training to many who may not get this type of training otherwise. Overall, the planners we interviewed had a favorable impression of SLATT trainings. They noted that the no-cost aspect and the quality of trainings SLATT provided were instrumental in their being able to ensure that state and local law enforcement personnel in their region received training on terrorism. The fact that SLATT training also is intended to support the NSI is one way of helping to ensure that state and local law enforcement learn about how to report suspicious terrorism-related activities.

With these considerations in mind, we offer the following suggestions for improving the SLATT Program.

### *Planning Process*

There appears to be a demand for SLATT trainings. According to a SLATT official, it is not uncommon for there to be a backlog of 120 requests for SLATT training. That is, there are more requests for SLATT briefings and workshops than the program is currently able to fill. To prioritize SLATT events, a host of factors are considered, including the requesting entity (local/state versus federal), potential audience size, and geographical spread. How the planning is done and the degree to which localities drive the content and focus of trainings vary. Trainings are requested by USAOs, JTTFs, and/or state and local law enforcement. SLATT Program staff suggest to these entities what type of workshop would best fit their needs and what other stakeholders to bring into the planning process or to reach out to in marketing the training. SLATT is also now considering how to prioritize SLATT events by taking into account operational necessity. How operational necessity will be defined remains to be seen and raises the question about what is the right balance: (1) having SLATT training needs driven from the bottom up, with localities and regions determining what their terrorism-related training needs are and what topics would be particularly germane to state and local law enforcement or (2) having SLATT training driven from the top down, in consultation with the FBI, determining what type

of training is needed based on the threat and which jurisdictions to prioritize for the SLATT trainings. In our view, there is value in striking a balance between the two approaches and having this type of training broadly reach the law enforcement community. In addition, there is value in reaching regions of the country that may not necessarily get this type of training given that training resources have disproportionately gone to urban areas, but even smaller jurisdictions face terrorist threats.

One way to extend the reach of SLATT training may be to prioritize train-the-trainer workshops. How proactive the train-the-trainer participants reported being in terms of disseminating what they learned suggests that their “reach” in terms of training other law enforcement personnel is greater than that of those who participate in the investigative/intelligence workshops. A key question we were unable to answer was the degree to which the train-the-trainer workshop participants actually develop courses and trainings for their agencies and, ultimately, how many law enforcement personnel they themselves train. IIR estimated that, since 1996, SLATT’s train-the-trainer workshops had trained 3,479 individuals as of September 1, 2016, and that they in turn have provided training to 268,597 individuals (personal communication with SLATT Program director R. Marquise, September 9, 2016). One question in terms of extending the reach of SLATT then is whether emphasizing the train-the-trainer workshops can maximize the number of law enforcement personnel trained. To understand this better, follow-up would need to be done with the train-the-trainer group to gather data on what was actually done in terms of developing courses or other types of training, what the content of those courses were, whom they trained, and how many law enforcement personnel were trained. Ultimately, one would be interested in understanding whether the information from the courses or trainings changed in any way law enforcement personnel’s approach to terrorist threats in their locality, including information-sharing.

### *Interest in Learning About Local Threats*

Given that the investigative/intelligence workshop participants valued training that included learning about local threats, the SLATT Program may want to consider ways to more formally engage the USAOs, local FBI representatives, and JTTFs, including how to get a commitment from them to send their key personnel to participate in and to present about local threats. IIR tries to work examples of local threats for a particular region into its own course briefings. IIR also invites representatives from these federal entities to present at the workshop and to participate in informal discussions as part of a local panel (typically at the end of the first or second day of the intelligence/investigative workshops).

However, our observation was that how much these representatives sent personnel to attend and how effective they were in engaging the workshop participants in a discussion of local threats varied. A discussion of local threats in some instances was held informally at the end of the first or second day of a workshop, but the discussion varied in how much workshop participants engaged in Q&A and were effectively engaged in a discussion of local threats.

Having a formal panel charged with specifically discussing local threats and what it means for law enforcement that includes both state and local law enforcement representatives and representatives from these federal entities may be a way to ensure federal participation in the workshops and to facilitate more-robust discussion among the attendees about how they might coordinate with one another. Workshop participants also could be asked to submit questions they might have for federal representatives in advance of the workshop.

### *Improve Networking Opportunities*

Law enforcement personnel who participated in the investigative/intelligence workshops and the train-the-trainer workshops indicated that a key goal of theirs was taking advantage of the networking opportunities afforded with other state and local law enforcement agencies and with other criminal justice agencies. Comments from planners indicated that they observed that law enforcement personnel were engaged and following up with instructors after presentations.

The question is how to facilitate the networking opportunities among law enforcement in general. The above-mentioned panel is one possible avenue for facilitating networking opportunities for law enforcement. There may also be opportunities for event planners to organize no-host socials that give attending officers, especially those traveling from out of town, an opportunity to socialize and interact outside the formal training venue.

### *Incorporate More Content on Training Techniques and How to Build and Design Briefings and Courses in the Train-the-Trainer Workshops*

Train-the-trainer workshop participants differed in some important ways from trainees who attended the SLATT intelligence/investigative workshops. Specifically, they tended to be more experienced law enforcement officers and were more likely to travel farther to attend the SLATT workshops. They tended to be more measured in their assessment of the usefulness of the information provided in the workshops. They also were more likely to be proactive in networking with other participants and SLATT instructors, in using the content of the SLATT website, and in sharing the information they had learned. Train-the-trainer workshop participants in general used more of the SLATT website and used it for a range of training and research activities.

Our observations of the three train-the-trainer workshops we attended and discussions with law enforcement personnel and planners at these trainings suggest that such participants would be interested in having some dedicated workshop time and guidance on how to build and design a briefing or course based on the content provided and to get feedback from instructors on their examples.

### *Further Assess How Law Enforcement Uses the SLATT Website and Its Potential for Building a Community of Interest*

In addition to the in-person trainings, the SLATT Program views its website as an important mechanism for disseminating information about trainings, content that is intended to inform law enforcement about terrorism topics, and information to be used by trainers to develop their own briefings and courses. Indeed, nearly two-thirds of the train-the-trainer participants planned to use the SLATT website and materials to design their own courses.

This suggests the SLATT website is seen as an important resource by law enforcement trainers. In a sense, the website can be thought of as an opportunity to create a community of interest among law enforcement in this area. It would be valuable for the SLATT Program to collect more-detailed data on website usage and outreach. This would include refining its post-event evaluation surveys to collect more-detailed data on how SLATT participants are using the website and their assessment of its different components. Also, understanding more in-depth which information and resources on the SLATT website were most valuable to law enforcement personnel involved in training would be useful in considering how the website's content and materials can be strengthened. This could lend insight into SLATT's educational value and whether users perceive it as an immediate or enduring resource. There is also a need to regularly monitor usage of the website to understand how it can be more effectively tied to trainings. Maintaining and regularly updating the content of a website such as SLATT's requires a dedicated administration of the website. An assessment should be done to determine the administrative costs associated with doing so.

### *Improve the Marketing of SLATT Workshops to Law Enforcement*

How workshop participants hear about SLATT training opportunities differed, suggesting that marketing efforts might be tailored to the different groups. Overall, one-third of participants (i.e., the investigative/intelligence and train-the-trainer workshop participants combined) heard about the most recent SLATT training opportunity they attended through their commander, captain, or chief, suggesting that these law enforcement officers should be targeted by local planners and by IIR. In addition, the train-the-trainer workshop participants appear to be more attuned to what training opportunities are available in this area (e.g., the SLATT website and/or newsletter was a key way in which 40 percent of train-the-trainer participants learned about upcoming workshops, compared with only 12 percent of investigative/intelligence workshop participants). Thus, in addition to marketing to law enforcement leaders, the SLATT website and newsletters are also important vehicles for disseminating information about upcoming training opportunities. We wonder whether there might be other vehicles to disseminate this information, such as law enforcement regional and national associations or newsletters and federal training announcements that can be used to announce SLATT training opportunities.

## Suggestions for Future Assessments of BJA's SLATT Program

One of the questions we were unable to answer is how different types of personnel differed in their assessment of the quality and value of the SLATT training. With the exception of our comparison between participants in the investigative/intelligence workshops and participants in train-the-trainer workshops, other comparisons of interest might include federal law enforcement compared with state and local law enforcement or law enforcement from major metropolitan areas with a higher threat of terrorism compared with law enforcement from jurisdictions with lower terrorism risk. Only 16 survey respondents were federal personnel—too small a number to allow us to do meaningful subgroup analysis to compare how their answers may have varied from those of state and local law enforcement. Other comparisons might have included whether intelligence analysts found the SLATT training to be more or less valuable than police officers did; again, because only eight survey respondents were intelligence analysts—whereas the majority of respondents were detective/investigators, supervisors, patrolmen/officers, or trainers—we were unable to conduct that type of subgroup comparison. That said, the respondents to our survey were predominantly state and local law enforcement personnel who had eight or more years of law enforcement experience and who had CT as a major responsibility of their job; this suggests that SLATT training is reaching law enforcement personnel with knowledge of and/or responsibility for CT.

We also gleaned insights from the comparison of participants in the more general investigative/intelligence and train-the-trainer workshops. Participants in the train-the-trainer workshops tended to be more experienced law enforcement personnel and tended to rate less favorably the utility of the information provided about domestic or international terrorist threats than participants in the more general investigative/intelligence workshops did. At the same time, they were more likely to rate the SLATT training as an important opportunity to make new connections with the law enforcement community working locally or regionally on terrorist threats and with other justice agencies.

In addition, although we had information on what type of jurisdiction the survey respondents represented, we were unable to identify those that may have come from jurisdictions where the terrorism risk is higher. Therefore, an outstanding question is this: If one compares the demographics of the SLATT training program participants and characteristics of the jurisdictions they represent, do we find variation in their ratings of the SLATT Program that could help inform what impact it is having and how to better tailor the SLATT Program to meet the needs across the spectrum of law enforcement personnel? In other words, who benefits most from SLATT training—personnel with more CT experience or those with less CT knowledge and experience? Personnel who come from higher-terrorism-risk jurisdictions or personnel from lower-risk jurisdictions? And how might SLATT training be tailored to meet the needs of these different groups?

One of the challenges in evaluating the effectiveness of BJA's SLATT Program is that it is broad in its reach; however, when we look at exposure to SLATT trainings, the majority of survey respondents indicated that they had participated in one or two SLATT trainings within the past five years. That suggests that the exposure to the information provided in the workshops is not enough to assume that it will necessarily lead to actual behavioral change; a more realistic set of expectations may be that it will help increase law enforcement's awareness and understanding of international and domestic terrorist threats, that it provides law enforcement with important network opportunities, that through the SLATT website, it provides more in-depth information for those interested in learning more, and that it provides trainers with the materials and information to train other personnel within their agency.

The survey we conducted asked SLATT training participants, whether, within the few months following the training, they had undertaken any of the following actions: (1) changed how they approach and/or investigate domestic and international terrorist threats, (2) contacted other workshop participants or instructors to share information or request additional information, (3) shared the information that they had learned with other law enforcement colleagues, and (4) used the SLATT website and for what purpose. For example, a number of workshop participants reported that it did change their approach to terrorist threats and how they investigated these different types of threats. However, we had no way to verify what specific actions were undertaken as a result. Further, it would be important to know what other CT training the SLATT workshop participants may have received. A follow-up study might try to capture such information and might focus specifically on the train-the-trainer workshop participants to gather data on how they used the SLATT training and website information to develop courses for their agencies, how many law enforcement personnel they have trained, how those personnel have used the information, and what additional training and information needs trainers may have.

The content of the SLATT courses across the different workshops tended to be similar, and the courses were taught for the most part by the same set of instructors with experience in CT. It was beyond the scope of this assessment to evaluate the instructors themselves or the quality of their instruction. IIR evaluates new instructors, providing them feedback on their instructional approach and briefings, and tries to keep the material updated as the terrorism landscape changes. Although the instructors' résumés suggested that they have the relevant expertise, a more formal assessment of the instruction provided by SLATT instructors and the consistency of the message on different aspects of CT would be worthwhile.

In terms of costs, our early interviews highlighted that the costs of SLATT training to law enforcement agencies were modest, including the direct costs of sending several officers to training and backfilling those positions, and the indirect costs of other training. Because many agencies may send one or a few personnel to a SLATT workshop, we felt that these costs would be modest and determined that it was infeasible to do a formal cost survey of these agencies to capture the costs of sending one or two officers to the training. Therefore, we depended on the interview data with the planners and on self-reported information from the survey of workshop

participants to get some initial insights on costs of SLATT training to law enforcement. We did not formally assess the costs to planners and host agencies of the trainings; however, future studies might wish to quantify the costs associated with planning, marketing to and recruiting law enforcement participants, and hosting the workshops (which includes finding a venue and the associated logistical support) to get a complete picture of the law enforcement direct costs of SLATT training. Lastly, as is true for prevention in general, it is difficult to quantify the magnitude and cost of terrorism-related incidents prevented or the value of the relationships and networks developed.

## Appendix A. RAND Survey of SLATT Workshop Participants

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### RAND SURVEY OF SLATT WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

You recently participated in a terrorism workshop conducted by SLATT (the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program). The RAND Corporation would like to request your participation in an online survey to get your feedback on the training that you received.

The RAND Corporation is a non-partisan, non-profit research institution. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has asked RAND to conduct an evaluation of the SLATT Program. As part of this evaluation, RAND would like to understand the perceptions and experiences of individuals, like yourself, who have participated in a SLATT training or workshop. Your participation will help NIJ understand the impact of SLATT and help improve future SLATT workshops. The online survey will take about 20 minutes.

The information you provide in this survey is completely confidential and your responses will not be connected in any way with your name, department/agency, or email address.

If you have any questions or concerns about this survey or about the study in general, please contact the study's Principal Investigator, Dr. Lois Davis at tel. 310-393-0411 ext. 7330 or [Lmdavis@rand.org](mailto:Lmdavis@rand.org). You may also contact the NIJ project officer, Dr. John Picarelli, at tel. 202.307.3213 or [John.Picarelli@usdoj.gov](mailto:John.Picarelli@usdoj.gov).

#### Background Information

1. Please select the response that best describes your jurisdiction? (choose one answer)
  - a. City/County
  - b. State
  - c. Joint Terrorism Task Force/Fusion Cell
  - d. Federal
  - e. Military
  - f. College campus
  - g. Other (briefly describe) \_\_\_\_\_
2. Please select the response that **best describes** your current position? (choose one answer)
  - a. Police chief
  - b. Intelligence analyst
  - c. Patrolman
  - d. Officer
  - e. Detective/Investigator
  - f. Special Agent
  - g. Supervisor

- h. Trainer
- i. Unit commander (e.g., counter-terrorism unit, fusion center, etc.)
- j. U.S. Attorney or prosecutor
- k. U.S. military or military contractor
- l. Administrator
- m. Security manager/coordinator
- n. Other (briefly describe) \_\_\_\_\_

3. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Counter-terrorism or terrorism prevention is a major responsibility of my job.” (choose one answer)

- a. Strongly disagree
- b. Disagree
- c. Neither agree or disagree
- d. Agree
- e. Strongly agree

4. How many years have you worked in law enforcement? (choose one answer)

- a. 1-4 years
- b. 4-8 years
- c. 8-12 years
- d. 12 or more years

5. How many SLATT training events or workshops have you attended (to include your most recent SLATT workshop) during the past five years? (choose one answer)

- a. One
- b. Two
- c. Three
- d. Four
- e. Five or more

### **Views Regarding the Most Recent SLATT Trainings or Workshops That You Have Attended**

6. What was the most recent SLATT training or workshop that you attended? (choose one answer)

- a. SLATT Advanced Investigative/Intelligence Workshop, Hot Springs, AR (June 10-11, 2014)
- b. SLATT Train-the-Trainer Workshop, Mobile, AL (August 6-7, 2014)
- c. SLATT Train-the-Trainer Workshop, Franklin, MA (August 26-27, 2014)
- d. SLATT Train-the-Trainer Workshop, Camp Hill, PA (October 1-2, 2014)
- e. SLATT Investigative/Intelligence Workshop, Countryside, IL (November 5-7, 2014)
- f. Other (briefly describe) \_\_\_\_\_

7. How far away was the SLATT training or workshop from your place of employment?  
(choose one answer)
- a. Within a 25 mile radius
  - b. 25 to 50 miles radius
  - c. 50 to 100 miles radius
  - d. 100 miles or more
8. How did you hear about the SLATT training event or workshop? (choose all that apply)
- a. Colleagues
  - b. Supervisor, Commander, Captain, or Chief
  - c. Local Attorneys office
  - d. State U.S. Attorney's office
  - e. State or regional joint task force or fusion center
  - f. SLATT website or newsletter
  - g. DHS, FBI, or other federal entity
  - h. Other (briefly describe): \_\_\_\_\_

*For this most recent SLATT training or workshop you attended, please answer the following questions about it.*

9. Which answers below best describe your goals for attending the most recent SLATT training or workshop you attended? (choose all that apply)
- a. To receive educational credit
  - b. To better position me for promotion
  - c. To meet other law enforcement professionals
  - d. To improve my understanding of international threats
  - e. To improve my understanding of domestic/local terrorist threats
  - f. To enhance my counter terrorism investigative skills
  - g. To enhance my investigative skills, other than terrorism-related
  - h. To learn more about investigating financial criminal activity
  - i. Other \_\_\_\_\_

10. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding the **information provided** at the SLATT training or workshop? (for each row, choose one answer)

Strongly Disagree    Disagree    Neither Agree or Disagree    Agree    Strongly Agree    Not Applicable

10a. The  
information  
provided on  
domestic terrorist  
threats was useful

10b. The  
information  
provided on  
international  
terrorist threats was  
useful

10c. The  
information  
provided on  
financial crime was  
useful

10d. The SLATT  
workshop caused  
me to change how I  
approach and/or  
investigate  
domestic terrorist  
threats

10e. The SLATT  
workshop caused  
me to change how I  
approach and/or  
investigate  
international  
terrorist threats

11a. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding the **networking opportunities** provided at the most recent SLATT training or workshop that you attended? (for each row, choose one answer)

Strongly Disagree    Disagree    Disagree Somewhat    Agree Somewhat    Agree    Strongly Agree Not Applicable

The training/  
workshop provided  
opportunities for  
me to make new  
connections in the  
law enforcement  
community  
working locally or  
regionally on this  
issue

The  
training/workshop  
enabled me to  
make new  
connections with  
other justice  
agencies and  
experts (locally or  
regionally)

11b. Since the SLATT event have you contacted (through email, phone, or personal contact) **other training or workshop participants** that you had met?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Don't Know

11c. Since the SLATT event have you contacted (through email, phone, or personal contact) **the SLATT lecturers** that you had met?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Don't Know

12. Did you **share information** from the SLATT training, workshop, or website with law enforcement or other colleagues who were unable to attend the event? (choose all that apply)

- a. I spoke with colleagues about what I learned from the SLATT event
- b. I shared the SLATT training/workshop handouts with my colleagues
- c. I shared the SLATT website URL address with colleagues
- d. I shared specific content (e.g., briefings, SLATT newsletters) from the SLATT website with my colleagues
- e. Based on what I learned from the SLATT training or workshop, I gave a class or briefing to others in my agency or department
- f. Other (briefly describe) \_\_\_\_\_
- g. No, I did not share the information I learned

### Questions for Train-the-Trainer Events

13. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “I feel sufficiently prepared after the SLATT Train-the-Trainer workshop to teach others the material that was covered in the workshop.” (choose one answer)

- a. Disagree
- b. Disagree somewhat
- c. Neither agree or disagree
- d. Agree somewhat
- e. Agree

14. Are you planning to use the material you learned in the SLATT Train-the-Trainer workshop to teach colleagues who were unable to attend the event? (choose one answer)

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Don't Know

15. (If response to 13 is “d or e”) In what capacity do you plan to teach others about what you learned? (choose all the apply)

- a. I plan to show them how to use the various resources from the SLATT training and/or website
- b. I plan to share some of the materials from the SLATT training and/or website with colleagues
- c. I plan to use the class materials and notes from the SLATT training and/or website to design my own class to teach colleagues
- d. Other (briefly describe): \_\_\_\_\_

### Questions about the SLATT Website ([www.slatt.org](http://www.slatt.org))

16. In the past three months, how often have you visited the SLATT website? (choose one answer)

- a. 1-2 times
- b. 3-4 times
- c. 5-6 times
- d. 7 or more times
- e. None

If none, skip to Q18:

17. If you visited the SLATT website within the past three months, what did you do? (check all that apply)

- a. Registered for a SLATT training or workshop
- b. Reviewed the SLATT bulletin
- c. Reviewed the Virtual library
- d. Searched the Terrorism Incidents Database

- e. Reviewed online training material
- f. Watched a video
- g. Reviewed SLATT publications
- h. Contacted a SLATT expert
- i. Other (briefly describe) \_\_\_\_\_

### **Costs to Attend the SLATT Training or Workshop**

18. How many working hours total would you estimate that you spent away from normal duties for the training or workshop you most recently attended (include time for travel and to attend the training or workshop)?

\_\_\_\_\_ hours

19. How was your position covered? (choose only one answer)

- a. It was not covered
- b. Filled by a colleague on regular pay
- c. Filled by a colleague on overtime pay
- d. Filled by a colleague, but I'm not sure if the colleague was on regular or overtime pay
- e. Other (briefly describe) \_\_\_\_\_
- f. Do not know

21. How was your participation funded for the most recent SLATT training or workshop that you attended? (choose only one answer)

- a. My department provided me full reimbursement for hotel/travel expenses
- b. My department provided only partial reimbursement for hotel/travel expenses
- c. My department did not provide any reimbursement for hotel/travel expenses

22. Please estimate how much your department or agency paid to send you to the SLATT training or workshop:

- a. Travel (e.g. fuel, flight, cab) \$ \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Food/drink \$ \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Hotel \$ \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Other (briefly describe) \$ \_\_\_\_\_

## CHOICE EXPERIMENT

In the last section of this survey, we would like to have your input on the design of potential future courses. Specifically, we would like to understand your preferences for course topics, length, location, and registration cost. We will ask you to compare six pairs of options. Please indicate your preferred option in each of the pairs.

If you were to help redesigning the course, which option would you prefer?

*Web survey provides the participant with a series of pairwise options that they choose between as illustrated below in Figure A1.*

- Topics Covered (domestic terrorism, domestic terrorism with local examples, domestic and international terrorism, etc.).
- Course Length (1-4 days)
- Location (distance travelled ranging from within 25 miles, 25-100 miles, more than 100 miles)
- Course cost (\$0, \$100, \$200) (although SLATT does not charge a registration fee for their trainings, however, local planners and law enforcement agencies that host the event may charge to recoup some of their costs).

An example of the choice experiment options a survey respondent would see in the online version of the survey is shown in Figure A1. They are given two options, each associated with a different content, course length, distance, and registration fee. The respondent must indicate which one is preferred. The respondent is shown six of these questions in total. Each question has different combination of levels for content, length, location, and fee. In responding to the questions, respondents are using their personal views on how 'bad' or costly they perceive fewer topics or courses that are far away, for example, to decide which future scenario they prefer.

**Figure A.1. Screenshot of One Question in the Choice Experiment**

If you were to help redesigning the course, which option would you prefer?

	Option A	Option B
Topics covered	domestic terrorism	domestic terrorism with local examples
Course length	1 day	2 days
Course location	25 miles to 100 miles	within 25 miles
Course registration fee	\$0	\$100

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☐

**Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. Do you have any other comments or suggestions for ways to improve the SLATT trainings or workshops that this survey has not covered?**

## Appendix B. Description of Select SLATT Program Features

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### Instructors

SLATT currently employs 26 instructors, according to its website. The SLATT IIR program director outlined a process whereby IIR leverages its knowledge networks to identify their instructors. It looks for substantive subject-matter experts who can draw on their field experience when teaching students about terrorism-related topics and for candidates who are skillful teachers who can effectively communicate their perspectives and experiences. The backgrounds of SLATT instructors vary. The majority are retired law enforcement officials with more than 15–20 years of practical field experiences. Many have staffed or led a variety of interagency counternarcotic, CT, or counterintelligence task forces. Table B.1 illustrates the type of backgrounds that SLATT instructors have. When describing its recruiting protocol, the IIR program director commented,

We leverage the personal relationships we have built, use word of mouth, and make use of personal references. . . . I'm working to identify the next generation of SLATT instructors. You have to find instructors who know how to teach and can relate to cops, in addition to being experienced. As our budget dwindles, it will be difficult to attract the right type of people for instructor positions.

IIR also evaluates new instructors, providing them with feedback on their instructional approach and briefings and tries to keep the material updated as the terrorism landscape changes.

**Table B.1. Example of SLATT Instructors' Backgrounds and Experiences**

<b>SLATT Course</b>	<b>Current Job and Position</b>	<b>Terrorism-Related Experience</b>
Terrorism Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unit head, a state police CT bureau</li> <li>• Supervises detectives assigned to tri-state area (FBI) JTTFs.</li> <li>• M.A., education</li> <li>• B.A., criminal justice</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A state office of homeland security and preparedness</li> <li>• Helped managed international terrorism investigations for FBI</li> <li>• U.S. Marine Corps Reserve</li> </ul>
Investigating Illegitimate Financial Tactics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Certified fraud examiner</li> <li>• Certified anti-money laundering specialist</li> <li>• B.A., business administration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• &gt;25 years as a special agent for the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Criminal Investigative Division</li> <li>• Formed the first narcotics task force in an East Coast city</li> </ul>
International Terrorism and Campus Radicalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Director of SLATT since 2010</li> <li>• SLATT instructor since 2002</li> <li>• M.A., special studies: concentration in crime and commerce</li> <li>• B.A., English</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 31 years with FBI</li> <li>• Chief of Terrorism Research and Analysis Center at FBI Headquarters</li> <li>• Taught at international law enforcement academies in three countries</li> </ul>
Domestic Terrorism for Campus Law Enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joined IIR as a senior research associate in 1999</li> <li>• Qualified explosives technician</li> <li>• Experience handling bombing investigations</li> <li>• M.S., guidance and counseling</li> <li>• B.S.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FBI special agent for &gt;31 years</li> <li>• 30 years of experience in political terrorism</li> <li>• Supervisor of a city's terrorism task force (1984)</li> </ul>
Social Media and Terrorism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Member of the state police</li> <li>• Commander of a violent crimes task force</li> <li>• M.S., criminal justice</li> <li>• B.S.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 8 years with (FBI) JTTF</li> <li>• Experience investigating international terrorism conspiracies</li> <li>• Authored policy on the use of social media in intelligence and investigative activities</li> </ul>

## SLATT Website

SLATT provides both on-site and online training. Its restricted-access website ([www.slatt.org](http://www.slatt.org)) serves three functions: It supports on-site training by providing registrants information resources for their upcoming SLATT course, it is the medium through which online training occurs, and it serves a research and education function for those interested in terrorism-related issues. The SLATT website supports on-site training events by providing registrants access to a range of materials prior to a training event. One must register and request approval before being granted access to the site. Before registering, visitors must specify if they merely want access to the site or intend to register for a workshop. Once logged in, a visitor can click “Online Training” and receive information on their particular training workshop, in addition to other upcoming events.


One can also download training materials five to seven days prior to the workshop for which they are registered.

The website also features the BJA SLATT Terrorism Incidents Database, which provides law enforcement professionals with current information about terrorist events and trends. From a macro level, the database “monitors criminal acts meant to coerce or intimidate a government or the civilian population in furtherance of political or social objectives.”<sup>47</sup> It is composed of unclassified, publicly available information and managed by IIR subject-matter experts. Database users can perform a “geospatial search” and sort information by a variety of criteria, to include date, location, precursor terrorist indicator, affected infrastructure type, and/or group affiliation in relation to distance from a specified location.<sup>48</sup> SLATT’s Virtual Library is a collection of resources on terrorism-related topics from a range of Internet sources.

### *Website Usage*

SLATT’s website usage has increased on an annual basis; however, IIR has only recently begun monitoring and analyzing these usage rates and other statistics. IIR provided RAND with other usage statistics. Figure B.1 and Table B.2 provide select website statistics from 2012 and mid-2015. Note that this is not a one-for-one comparison; different usage information was measured across the two time periods.

**Figure B.1. SLATT.org Statistics Provided by IIR in 2012**



SOURCE: Provided by IIR in 2013.

<sup>47</sup> Accessible to SLATT participants at <https://www.slatt.org/SLATT/TerrorismIncidents>.

<sup>48</sup> Accessible to SLATT participants at <https://www.slatt.org/SLATT/TerrorismIncidents>.

**Table B.2. SLATT.org Statistics Provided by IIR in 2015**

<b>Visits</b>	<b>Page Views</b>	<b>Hits</b>
428, 529	9,988,237	24,614,985

SOURCE: Provided by IIR in May 2015.

NOTE: Date range: May 25, 2010–May 24, 2015.

## Appendix C. Cost and Benefit Model Statistics

Table C.1 reports the conditional logit regression results for all programs pooled, only the investigative/intelligence program, and only the train-the-trainer program. Table C.2 reports the same regression results but using jackknifed standard errors. The two tables do not differ substantively from one another.

**Table C.1. Conditional Logit Regression Analysis of Value of SLATT Trainings**

<b>Dependent Variable: Participant's Choice</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>Investigative/ Intelligence</b>	<b>Train-the- Trainer</b>
Registration fee (omitted: \$0)			
\$100	−0.700*** (0.142)	−0.425** (0.215)	−0.926*** (0.193)
\$200	−1.172*** (0.150)	−0.839*** (0.225)	−1.443*** (0.205)
Course length (omitted: 1 day)			
2 days	0.568*** (0.162)	0.811*** (0.253)	0.428** (0.213)
3 days	1.027*** (0.166)	1.177*** (0.257)	0.955*** (0.220)
4 days	0.509*** (0.166)	0.901*** (0.256)	0.227 (0.220)
Course content (omitted: domestic only)			
Domestic + local	0.209 (0.139)	0.444** (0.213)	0.033 (0.186)
Domestic + local + international	1.025*** (0.145)	1.142*** (0.223)	0.927*** (0.194)
Distance to training (omitted: <25 miles)			
25–100 miles away	−0.115 (0.139)	−0.106 (0.212)	−0.133 (0.186)
100+ miles away	−0.997*** (0.147)	−1.058*** (0.230)	−0.984*** (0.193)
Pseudo R-squared	0.132	0.132	0.146
Observations	1,398	600	798

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table C.2. Conditional Logit Regression Analysis with Adjusted Standard Errors**

<b>Dependent Variable: Participant's Choice</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>Investigative/ Intelligence</b>	<b>Train-the- Trainer</b>
Registration fee (omitted: \$0)			
\$100	−0.700*** (0.136)	−0.425* (0.232)	−0.926*** (0.162)
\$200	−1.172*** (0.177)	−0.839*** (0.274)	−1.443*** (0.234)
Course length (omitted: 1 day)			
2 days	0.568*** (0.194)	0.811** (0.328)	0.428 (0.253)
3 days	1.027*** (0.181)	1.177*** (0.309)	0.955*** (0.231)
4 days	0.509** (0.223)	0.901** (0.370)	0.227 (0.286)
Course content (omitted: domestic only)			
Domestic + local	0.209 (0.148)	0.444* (0.235)	0.033 (0.194)
Domestic + local + international	1.025*** (0.185)	1.142*** (0.290)	0.927*** (0.247)
Distance to training (omitted: <25 miles)			
25–100 miles away	−0.115 (0.150)	−0.106 (0.230)	−0.133 (0.209)
100+ miles away	−0.997*** (0.150)	−1.058*** (0.239)	−0.984*** (0.200)
Pseudo R-squared	0.132	0.132	0.146
Observations	1,398	600	798

NOTE: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses. \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## Lists of Figures and Tables

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### Figures

Figure 2.1. Number of Jihadi Extremists Indicted or Killed, by Year, in the United States .....	18
Figure 2.2. Number of People Killed in the United States by Jihadi Terrorism.....	18
Figure 2.3. Number of Domestic Extremists Indicted or Killed, by Year .....	20
Figure 2.4. Number of People Killed in the United States by Domestic Terrorism .....	21
Figure 2.5. Law Enforcement's Perception of National and Local Terrorism Threat.....	23
Figure 4.1. Percentage of Training Participants for Whom Counterterrorism Is a Major Responsibility of Their Job.....	41
Figure 4.2. How Participants Learned About the SLATT Training or Workshop (%) .....	43
Figure 4.3. Participants' Assessment of Usefulness of Domestic Terrorist Threat Information Provided.....	45
Figure 4.4. Participants' Assessment of Usefulness of International Terrorist Threat Information Provided.....	46
Figure 4.5. Participants' Assessment of Whether Training Received Would Affect Their Approach to Domestic Terrorist Threats .....	47
Figure 4.6 Participants' Assessment of Whether Training Received Would Affect Their Approach to International Terrorist Threats .....	48
Figure 4.7. Participants' Assessment of Whether the SLATT Workshops Provided Opportunities to Network with the Law Enforcement Community.....	49
Figure 4.8. Participants' Assessment of Whether the SLATT Workshops Provided Opportunities to Network with Other Justice Agencies and Experts .....	50
Figure 5.1. Screenshot of One Question in the Choice Experiment .....	61
Figure 5.2. Valuation of Three Key Attributes of the SLATT Training Workshops .....	65
Figure A.1. Screenshot of One Question in the Choice Experiment .....	90
Figure B.1. SLATT.org Statistics Provided by IIR in 2012 .....	93

### Tables

Table S.1. Summary of Suggestions for Improving the SLATT Program, by Topic Area .....	xii
Table 1.1. Examples of Topics Addressed by SLATT Training .....	6
Table 1.2. Overview of the Different Types of SLATT Workshops .....	8
Table 4.1. SLATT Trainings and Workshops Included in the Survey .....	37
Table 4.2. Type of Jurisdiction Training Participants Represented.....	38
Table 4.3. Current Position of Training Participants .....	39
Table 4.4. Number of Years Training Participants Have Worked in Law Enforcement.....	40

Table 4.5. Number of SLATT Training Events or Workshops Participants Had Attended During the Past Five Years .....	42
Table 4.6. How Far Away SLATT Training Was from Participants' Place of Employment.....	42
Table 4.7. Participants' Training Goals .....	44
Table 4.8. Participants' Assessment of Usefulness of Financial Crime Information Provided....	46
Table 4.9. Whether Participants Contacted Other Workshop Participants or SLATT Lecturers Following the Training Received .....	51
Table 4.10. Whether Participants Shared the Information from the SLATT Training, Workshop, or Website .....	52
Table 4.11. How Often Participants Visited the SLATT Website in the Past Three Months .....	52
Table 4.12. Participants' Reasons for Visiting the SLATT Website.....	53
Table 4.13. In What Capacity Train-the-Trainer Participants Planned to Teach Others .....	54
Table 5.1. Results of Costs of SLATT Programs, Mean and Standard Deviation .....	63
Table B.1. Example of SLATT Instructors' Backgrounds and Experiences .....	92
Table B.2. SLATT.org Statistics Provided by IIR in 2015.....	94
Table C.1. Conditional Logit Regression Analysis of Value of SLATT Trainings .....	95
Table C.2. Conditional Logit Regression Analysis with Adjusted Standard Errors.....	96

## Abbreviations

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AQAP	al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula
ATAC	Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council
BJA	Bureau of Justice Assistance
CT	counterterrorism
CV	contingent valuation
CVE	countering violent extremism
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DHS-EM	Cook County Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
DOJ	U.S. Department of Justice
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
GAO	U.S. Government Accountability Office
HVE	homegrown violent extremism
IIR	Institute for Intergovernmental Research
IS	Islamic State
JTTF	joint terrorism task force
NIJ	National Institute of Justice
RISS	Regional Information Sharing Systems
SLATT	State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training
SPDCE	stated preference discrete choice experiment
USAO	U.S. Attorney’s Office

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